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RECONCILING ORIGINALISM AND THE
HISTORY OF THE PUBLIC USE CLAUSE
Emily A. Johnson*
The history of the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause is virtually
nonexistent. For at least the last century, the U.S. Supreme Court has
interpreted its public use language broadly, allowing takings for the
purposes of rectifying urban blight, facilitating land redistribution, and
most recently, in Kelo v. City of New London, promoting economic benefit.
In that case, Justice Thomas dissented vigorously, arguing that the Kelo
Court had strayed from the original meaning of public use and urging it to
return to requiring actual use by the public when property is condemned.
In light of Justice Thomas’s argument that the Court had abandoned the
original meaning of the Takings Clause, this Note considers whether
historical evidence regarding original meaning provides a coherent
limiting principle. Particularly in the area of property expropriations, the
historical record does not indicate that the founding generation had a
concrete conception of the extent to which the right should be protected. As
a result, scholarship on both sides of the public use debate presents the best
evidence supporting its particular thesis, but no piece satisfactorily
incorporates all of the historical evidence. In light of these considerations,
this Note concludes by proposing how to reconcile originalism as a method
of Constitutional interpretation for a text with an essentially unattainable
original meaning and over a hundred years of case law divorced from an
originalist analysis.
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INTRODUCTION
“[Justice Thomas] doesn’t believe in stare decisis, period. If a
constitutional line of authority is wrong, he would say let’s get it right.”

–Justice Scalia1
Justice Thomas’s dissent in Kelo v. City of New London2 perfectly
illustrates Justice Scalia’s aforementioned observations. For the last
century, the U.S. Supreme Court has consistently interpreted the public use
language of the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause3 broadly.4 In Kelo,
Justice Thomas advocated abandoning this precedent and returning to
requiring use by the public when property is condemned, his view of the
Clause’s original meaning.5 In light of Justice Thomas’s argument that the
Kelo majority abandoned the original meaning of the Clause, this Note asks
if originalism provides a satisfactory methodology for interpreting public
use, an area where even purported originalists (like Justice Scalia) are not
consistently originalist.6 Finally, this Note addresses the viability of
originalism as a method of Constitutional interpretation where the original
meaning of the text is essentially unattainable7 and in which over a century
of case law has refrained from an originalist analysis.8
Before Kelo, the Court unanimously decided Berman v. Parker9 and
Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff,10 earlier cases addressing the
1. Jonathan Ringel, Thomas Bio Reveals Surprising Philosophy, DAILY REP., Aug. 2,
2004, at 1.
2. 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
3. “[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”
U.S. CONST. amend. V (emphasis added). This Note refers to the language “for public use”
as the Public Use Clause.
4. See infra Part II.A–B.1. This Note refers to a broad interpretation of the Public Use
Clause as an interpretation that includes public benefit in the idea of public use and a narrow
interpretation as literally requiring use by the public.
5. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 506 (Thomas, J., dissenting). No other Justice joined Justice
Thomas’s dissent. Id. at 505; see also infra note 130 and accompanying text (discussing the
inconsistencies in Justice Thomas’s definition of public use, as he alternated between
requiring that the public actually use the taken property and requiring only that the public
have a legal right to use the property). This Note focuses on the actual use requirement, as
the legal right to use property is a less stringent requirement that can overlap with purely
private takings. See infra note 130. For a detailed discussion of Justice Thomas’s dissent,
see infra Part II.B.3.
6. See William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause
and the Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782, 858 (1995) (“[E]ven originalists such as
Black and Scalia are not originalists when it comes to the Takings Clause.”); see also infra
notes 446–49 and accompanying text (explaining that the doctrine of compensation for
regulatory takings is not based on the original meaning of the Takings Clause).
7. See infra Parts III–V.
8. See infra Part II.A–B.1 (showing that the last century of public use jurisprudence has
relied on precedent, not a textual, structural, or historical analysis of the Takings Clause).
9. 348 U.S. 26 (1954). In Berman, eight members of the Court unanimously held that
property could be taken for the public purpose of rectifying urban blight. Id. at 36. Justice
Robert Jackson did not participate in the decision as he passed away prior to oral argument.
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limitations of the Public Use Clause. By allowing takings for the
rectification of urban blight in Berman and the facilitation of land
redistribution in Midkiff, the Court held that these public benefits satisfied
the Public Use Clause. The Court continued development of the public
benefit idea in Kelo by holding that takings for economic development also
satisfied the Clause’s strictures.11 Unlike the decisions in Berman and
Midkiff, the Kelo ruling ignited a firestorm of controversy from all sides of
the political spectrum.12 Even Justice John Paul Stevens, the author of the
majority opinion, “issued something like an apology.”13 Legally, though,
Kelo does not deviate from Supreme Court public use precedent.14
The state’s power to take private property through eminent domain
highlights the tension between individual rights and government power.15
In response to Kelo’s four vigorous dissenters, one scholar noted, “[T]here
are very few instances of Justices so directly challenging the philosophical
trend of the Court’s decisions.”16

See The Life of Robert H. Jackson, ROBERT H. JACKSON CENTER,
http://www.roberthjackson.org/the-man/ (last visited Sept. 23, 2010).
10. 467 U.S. 229 (1984). In Midkiff, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, writing
unanimously for eight members of the Court, held the Fifth Amendment did not prohibit
takings for the purpose of eliminating concentrated property ownership. Id. at 245. Justice
Thurgood Marshall did not participate in the Midkiff decision. Id. Following Midkiff, Justice
O’Connor also dissented in Kelo, arguing that the majority’s decision effectively removed
the Public Use Clause from the Fifth Amendment. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 494 (O’Connor, J.,
dissenting). For a discussion of Justice O’Connor’s dissenting opinion, joined by Chief
Justice William Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas, see infra Part II.B.2.
11. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 489–90.
12. Adam Liptak, Case Won on Appeal (To Public), N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2006, at WK3
(“The decision provoked outrage from Democrats and Republicans, liberals and libertarians,
and everyone betwixt and between.”); see also Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, The
Uselessness of Public Use, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1412, 1413 (2006) (“Everyone hates
Kelo.”).
13. Liptak, supra note 12.
14. See Richard A. Epstein, Public Use in a Post-Kelo World, 17 SUP. CT. ECON. REV.
151, 164 (2009) (“[T]here is little doubt that the decision is consistent with . . . Berman v.
Parker and Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff.”); John M. Zuck, Note, Kelo v. City of
New London: Despite the Outcry, the Decision is Firmly Supported by Precedent—
However, Eminent Domain Critics Still Have Gained Ground, 38 U. MEM. L. REV. 187, 22930 (2007) (“The Kelo decision was correct despite the criticism . . . . [F]rustration should be
aimed at the entire history of eminent domain decisions . . . not with Kelo, a decision that did
not itself change or expand the law.”); see also Part II.A (discussing pre-Kelo public use
jurisprudence).
15. See, e.g., James W. Ely Jr., “Poor Relation” Once More: The Supreme Court and
the Vanishing Rights of Property Owners, 2004–2005 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 39, 53 (“Eminent
domain is one of the most intrusive powers of government because it compels individual
owners, without their consent, to relinquish their property.”). This conflict between the
individual and the state has been central throughout American history. See infra Part
IV.A.1–2 for a discussion of how classical liberalism and republicanism, philosophies that
influenced early Americans, interpreted the balance between protecting individual rights
while allowing for necessary state interference.
16. Timothy Sandefur, Mine and Thine Distinct: What Kelo Says About Our Path, 10
CHAP. L. REV. 1, 47–48 (2006).
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For Justice Thomas, originalism provides the grounds for a total
reexamination of precedent.17 In response to his Kelo dissent, this Note
asks whether historical evidence regarding the meaning of the Public Use
Clause at the time of its drafting and ratification provides a coherent
limitation.18 To do so, this Note begins by examining original meaning as a
method of constitutional interpretation.19 Next, this Note outlines the last
century of Supreme Court public use jurisprudence, highlighting the
methodologies employed by the Justices.20
The following three parts detail the history of “public use,” focusing on
the sources originalists review to discover the original meaning of a phrase.
As a starting point, this Note examines the etymology of the phrase and the
structure and placement of the Takings Clause in the Bill of Rights.21 Next,
this Note details the drafting and ratification of the Clause, focusing in
particular on the philosophies of the eighteenth century political climate and
the realities of early America.22 This Note then explores how courts first
interpreted public use restrictions like the one at issue in Kelo.23
Throughout, this Note cites legal and historical scholarship to show that
opinions vary considerably as to whether the Public Use Clause originally
provided an occasional limit24 or a literal limit25 to the takings power.
Finally, this Note touches on another area of eminent domain law,
regulatory takings, where the Supreme Court has abandoned using original
meaning to interpret the Takings Clause.26 This Note concludes that the
absence of a satisfactory interpretation of the original meaning of “public
use” cautions against using a strict originalist interpretation, like the one
Justice Thomas proposed in his Kelo dissent.27 Indeed, this Note suggests
that originalist interpretation in a historical grey area may even be
intellectually disingenuous because it fails to connect modern jurisprudence
with “what the American People meant and did when We ratified and
amended the document.” 28 This Note closes by proposing that even though
originalism is not an appropriate mode of interpretation in this instance, the
opinions in Kelo and its predecessors nonetheless remain faithful to the
17. See infra Part I for a discussion of originalism as a judicial philosophy. This Note
focuses on the school of originalism associated with ascertaining the original public meaning
of the constitutional text at issue, not the original intent of the founders. See infra notes 30–
32 and accompanying text (clarifying the differences between original meaning and original
intent).
18. Historical analysis is relevant to the question of original meaning because, along
with text and structure, history and context can reveal the meaning of a particular clause. See
infra notes 197–199 and accompanying text.
19. See infra Part I.
20. See infra Part II.
21. See infra Part III.
22. See infra Part IV.
23. See infra Part V.
24. See infra Parts III.B, IV.C, V.B.
25. See infra Parts III.C, IV.D, V.C.
26. See infra Part VI.A.
27. See infra Part VI.B.
28. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Supreme Court, 1999 Term—Foreword: The Document
and the Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. REV. 26, 29 (2000); infra Part VI.B.
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ideals of early Americans, thereby fulfilling one of the methodology’s key
goals.29
I.

ORIGINALISM

Part I examines the judicial philosophy of originalism. In particular, it
explains how judges uncover the original public meaning of constitutional
text, a methodology distinct from the branch of originalism focused on
ascertaining the founders’ original intent.30 Indeed, original intent has been
criticized for being an indeterminate and speculative exercise, as well as a
practice antithetical to the framers’ actual intent.31 These criticisms of
original intent, however, do not discredit the school of originalism
associated with the search for original meaning.32 Accordingly, Part I
discusses the tools originalist jurists and scholars employ in practice,
explains both the criticisms and benefits of the methodology, and touches
on the relationship between originalism and stare decisis.
Originalism as a mode of constitutional interpretation is closely
associated with the approaches taken by current Supreme Court Justices
Scalia and Thomas, as well as other academics and commentators like
former Judge Robert Bork.33 While many associate originalism with a
more conservative philosophy, be it judicial or political, there are many
politically liberal scholars, like Professor Akhil Amar, who advocate for an
originalist approach to Constitutional interpretation.34

29. See infra Part VI.B; see also infra note 43 and accompanying text (explaining that
originalism connects modern jurisprudence to the decisions the founding generation made
when drafting the Constitution and Bill of Rights).
30. See JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF
THE CONSTITUTION 7–11 (1996) (clarifying the differences between original meaning and
original intent). Examining other methods of Constitutional interpretation is beyond the
scope of this Note. Moreover, in practice judges frequently employ a mix of interpretive
techniques. As this Note uses the purely originalist approach of Justice Thomas’s Kelo
dissent as a starting point for inquiry into the limitations of the philosophy, actual judicial
practice also exceeds the scope of discussion.
31. William Michael Treanor, Taking Text Too Seriously: Modern Textualism, Original
Meaning, and the Case of Amar’s Bill of Rights, 106 MICH. L. REV. 487, 496–97 (2007)
(“[T]he original understanding was that original understanding was irrelevant.” (citing H.
Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885, 948
(1985))).
32. Henry Paul Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 COLUM. L.
REV. 723, 725 (1988) (“[T]he critics are wrong in believing that in discrediting
intentionalism, they discredit originalism. The relevant inquiry must focus on the public
understanding of the language when the Constitution was developed.”).
33. See generally ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA (1990); Amar, supra
note 28; Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United
States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) [hereinafter A
MATTER OF INTERPRETATION]; Antonin Scalia, Foreword to ORIGINALISM: A QUARTERCENTURY OF DEBATE (Steven G. Calabresi, ed., 2007) [hereinafter ORIGINALISM]; Antonin
Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849 (1989).
34. Treanor, supra note 31, at 491.
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Proponents of this approach seek to ascertain the original meaning of
Constitutional text.35 Specifically, the original meaning scholars and judges
seek is “how the words used in the Constitution would have been
understood at the time [of the document’s drafting and ratification].”36 To
uncover this meaning, an originalist examines the definitions of individual
words in the text,37 the structure of the Constitutional clause, and all
relevant history—such as the ratification debates, tracts like The Federalist,
contemporary treatises, early judicial interpretations, and the like.38
Proponents of originalism argue that it constrains judicial decision
making by anchoring it to a set of rules and a distinct methodology—
textual, structural, and historical analysis—thus limiting the influence of an
interpreter’s personal beliefs.39 For example, Justice Scalia defends
originalism by explaining that “[w]ords do have a limited range of
meaning,” insisting that “no interpretation that goes beyond that range is
permissible.”40 He does admit, though, that originalists may not always
agree on a single interpretation.41

35. See, e.g., BORK, supra note 33, at 144 (“What is the meaning of a rule that judges
should not change? It is the meaning understood at the time of the law’s enactment. . . . All
that counts is how the words used in the Constitution would have been understood at the
time.”); Scalia, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, supra note 33, at 38 (“What I look for in the
Constitution is precisely what I look for in a statute: the original meaning of the text, not
what the original draftsmen intended.”).
36. BORK, supra note 33, at 144.
37. Critically examining the text of the Constitution itself, a technique some refer to as
textualism, is one of the key tools scholars use to discover the original meaning of the
document. Amar, supra note 28, at 28–29 (“[T]extual analysis dovetails with the study of
enactment history and constitutional structure. The joint aim of these related approaches is
to understand what the American People meant and did when We ratified and amended the
document.”). Although some scholars refer to the term “textualism” more broadly as the
branch of originalism associated with the search for original meaning, see Treanor, supra
note 31, at 496, this Note refers to textualism as a method by which the original meaning
may be discovered through an examination of the definition and placement of words.
38. See BORK, supra note 33, at 165; Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The
President’s Power To Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 553 (1994) (describing a fourstep methodology for ascertaining original meaning); Michael B. Rappaport, The Original
Meaning of the Recess Appointments Clause, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1487, 1493–95 (2005)
(noting interpreters at the time of the founding would have looked to factors like “text,
purpose, structure, and history”); see also STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY, INTERPRETING
OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 7–8 (2005) (noting all judges use these same basic
interpretive tools but place differing levels of emphasis on each).
39. David A. Strauss, Originalism, Precedent, and Candor, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 299,
299–300 (2005); Treanor, supra note 6, at 856.
40. Scalia, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, supra note 33, at 24; see also Michael B.
Rappaport, Reconciling Textualism and Federalism: The Proper Textual Basis of the
Supreme Court’s Tenth and Eleventh Amendment Decisions, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 819, 823
(1999) (explaining that the interpretation harmonizing ambiguous text with the rest of the
Constitution should be preferred).
41. Scalia, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, supra note 33, at 45 (“I do not suggest, mind
you, that originalists always agree upon their answer. There is plenty of room for
disagreement as to what original meaning was, and even more as to how that original
meaning applies to the situation before the court. But the originalist at least knows what he
is looking for: the original meaning of the text. Often—indeed, I dare say usually—that is
easy to discern and simple to apply.”). But see Monaghan, supra note 32, at 726
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Proponents also argue that originalism prevents the judiciary from
exerting power belonging to other branches of government.42 Further, by
interpreting the Constitution in accordance with the original meaning of the
text to the founding generation, originalism connects modern judicial
interpretation with decision making at the time of the adoption of the
Constitution and Bill of Rights.43
Critics, on the other hand, point out that judicial interpretation has always
been, at least in part, an exercise of discretion.44 While advocates of
originalism assert that it depoliticizes interpretation, Justice William
Brennan disagreed, claiming that it ignores political and social reality:
“Those who would restrict claims of right to the values of 1789 . . . turn a
blind eye to social progress and eschew adaptation of overarching principles
to changes of social circumstance.”45
Critics of originalism also note that the Constitution does not claim its
text is the sole point of reference in interpreting its guarantees.46 Nor, they
argue, did the framers explain how the Constitution should be interpreted or
whether its meaning should be frozen at the time of the founding.47 Finally,
for purely pragmatic reasons, these critics insist that searching for original
meaning is an intellectually difficult and indeterminate process that “leaves
too many things too wide open and suppresses too many important
considerations.”48
The relationship between original meaning and stare decisis can be tricky
for originalists.49 For example, a longstanding interpretation of a particular
(“[O]riginalism must refer to an understanding concrete enough to provide a real and
constraining guidance.”).
42. See Monaghan, supra note 32, at 723. Professor Alexander Bickel famously termed
this ability of unelected judges to overturn legislative acts passed by the prevailing majority
the “counter-majoritarian difficulty.” ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS
BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16–17 (1962).
43. Monaghan, supra note 32, at 723; Treanor, supra note 6, at 856; see also RAKOVE,
supra note 30, at 9 (“[T]he argument that the original meaning, once recovered, should be
binding . . . insists that original meaning should prevail—regardless of intervening revisions,
deviations, and the judicial doctrine of stare decisis—because the authority of the
Constitution as supreme law rests on its ratification by the special, popularly elected
conventions of 1787–88.”).
44. See Gordon S. Wood, Comment, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, supra note 33, at
49, 59.
45. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., Speech to the Text and Teaching Symposium at
Georgetown University (Oct. 12, 1985), in ORIGINALISM, supra note 33, at 55, 59.
46. See BREYER, supra note 38, at 117; Laurence H. Tribe, Comment, in A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION, supra note 33, at 65, 77–78.
47. See BREYER, supra note 38, at 117; Tribe, supra note 46, at 77–78.
48. David Strauss, Professor, The University of Chicago Law School, Panel on
Originalism and Precedent at the 2005 Federalist Society Lawyers Conference (Nov. 12,
2005), in ORIGINALISM, supra note 33, at 217, 218, 220 [hereinafter Strauss Remarks] (“[I]t
is very, very hard to do originalism right, even when you have every incentive to do it right,
and the chances of getting it wrong—even in something like ideal circumstances, the
chances of getting it wrong are very great.”); see also BREYER, supra note 38, at 124 (noting
that text, structure, and history often fail to provide objective guidance).
49. See Monaghan, supra note 32, at 727. Stare decisis is defined as, “The doctrine of
precedent, under which it is necessary for a court to follow earlier judicial decisions when
the same points arise again in litigation.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1537 (8th ed. 2004).
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Constitutional clause may vary from its original meaning.50 Originalists as
a group are not always strict about when original meaning should prevail
over precedent. While most accept a version of stare decisis,51 others argue
there is no Constitutional text mandating that precedent should always
triumph.52 Professor Steven Calabresi argues that, for policy reasons,
following a strict rule of stare decisis would make it difficult to correct
Supreme Court decisions due to the practical difficulties of amending the
Constitution.53
On the other hand, Professor David Strauss takes the opposite position—
that precedent is a better limiting principle for judicial overreaching than
original meaning—because he believes moral and social judgments
inevitably enter judicial decision making.54 Judges who rely on precedent
must be candid about when personal beliefs enter an opinion, whereas
originalists, he argues, “must insist that all they are doing is implementing
judgments made by someone else.”55 Further, relying on precedent
demonstrates respect for the rule of law, shows judicial restraint, and
illustrates the idea that important decisions should be made by elected
representatives.56
In practice, originalism is only one way to approach interpreting the
Constitution. In Kelo, however, Justice Thomas’s dissent squarely rejected
precedent in favor of original meaning, thereby providing a rare opportunity
to examine how originalism and precedent interact when the historical
record is sparse and frequently contradictory.57

50. See, e.g., Monaghan, supra note 32, at 727–39 (citing current interpretations of civil
liberties and structural issues like federalism, the separation of powers doctrine, and the
power of the presidency as instances where “the existing constitutional order is at variance
with what we know of the original understanding”).
51. See Tribe, supra note 46, at 82; see also Akhil Amar, Professor, Yale Law School,
Panel on Originalism and Precedent at the 2005 Federalist Society Lawyers Conference
(Nov. 12, 2005), in ORIGINALISM, supra note 33, at 210, 215 (proposing that, like the
presumption of a statute’s constitutionality, there should be a presumption that the Court will
follow its precedent).
52. Steven G. Calabresi, Professor, Northwestern Law School, Panel on Originalism and
Precedent at the 2005 Federalist Society Lawyers Conference (Nov. 12, 2005), in
ORIGINALISM, supra note 33, at 199, 200 [hereinafter Calabresi Remarks]; see infra note 158
(quoting Justice Thomas as saying that original meaning should prevail over precedent).
Originalists of this view point out that the Supremacy Clause makes the Constitution the
supreme law of the land. Id. But see Thomas W. Merrill, Professor, Columbia Law School,
Panel on Originalism and Precedent at the 2005 Federalist Society Lawyers Conference
(Nov. 12, 2005), in ORIGINALISM, supra note 33, at 223, 224 [hereinafter Merrill Remarks]
(arguing that starting from an originalist interpretation leaves no room for stare decisis at
all).
53. Calabresi Remarks, supra note 52, at 206–07.
54. See Strauss Remarks, supra note 48, at 220–22; Strauss, supra note 39, at 301.
55. Strauss, supra note 39, at 301.
56. See Merrill Remarks, supra note 52, at 223–24; Monaghan, supra note 32, at 748.
While Constitutional text and statements of the framers do appear in opinions, studies show
that approximately eighty percent of the authorities cited by courts are other precedents.
Merrill Remarks, supra note 52, at 224–25.
57. See infra Parts III–V.
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II. RECENT SUPREME COURT PUBLIC USE JURISPRUDENCE
Part II focuses on the last century of Supreme Court public use
jurisprudence. It begins by briefly examining cases the Kelo majority cited
when it held that public benefit from economic development satisfied the
Public Use Clause.58 Notably, these pre-Kelo cases interpreted public use
broadly by relying on precedent, not by engaging in the textual, structural,
or historical analyses associated with an originalist approach. Part II closes
by reviewing the Kelo majority opinion, as well as Justice O’Connor’s and
Justice Thomas’s dissenting opinions,59 focusing on the interpretive
methods guiding each of the analyses.60
A.

Pre-Kelo Jurisprudence

When it upheld the constitutionality of takings for the purpose of
economic development, the Kelo majority relied on earlier decisions
interpreting the Public Use Clause.61 Beginning near the turn of the
twentieth century,62 the Court upheld takings without engaging in a
historical analysis of the original meaning of the Clause.63 The early public
use cases are particularly interesting for the historical context in which they
arose. Despite the post-Civil War focus on individual rights,64 the Court at
the time allowed takings where the expropriation benefited the community
at large and disadvantaged individual landowners.
In Fallbrook Irrigation District v. Bradley,65 for example, the Court
upheld a law providing municipal corporations the ability to condemn land

58. See infra Part II.A.
59. Justice Kennedy’s fifth vote concurrence in Kelo focuses on how to determine if a
justification for the use of eminent domain is pretext. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545
U.S. 469, 490–93 (2005) (Kennedy, J., concurring). As Justice Kennedy does not weigh in
on original meaning, discussion of his concurrence is outside the scope of this Note.
60. See infra Part II.B.
61. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 480–89; see infra notes 104–08 and accompanying text.
62. The Court’s nineteenth century decision regarding a Mill Act statute in Head v.
Amoskeag Mfg. Co., 113 U.S. 9 (1885), also embraced a broad interpretation of public use.
See infra notes 385–88 and accompanying text (discussing Head in the context of the other
Mill Act cases).
63. See infra notes 65–71 and accompanying text.
64. See, e.g., Expert Report of Eric Foner, Gratz v. Bollinger, 183 F.R.D. 209 (E.D.
Mich. 1998) (No. 97-75231), Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 821 (E.D. Mich. 2001)
(No.
97-75928),
available
at
http://www.vpcomm.umich.edu/admissions/legal/
expert/foner.html (“Reconstruction represented less a fulfillment of the Revolution’s
principles than a radical repudiation of the nation’s actual practice for the previous seven
decades. . . . The underlying principles—that the federal government possessed the power to
define and protect citizens’ rights . . . were striking departures in American law.”); AKHIL
REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION, at xiii (1998)
(“Reconstruction . . . transformed the nature of the original Bill of Rights, leaving us with
something much closer to the Bill as conventionally understood today [as overwhelmingly
about individual rights].”); Eric Foner, The Original Intent of the Fourteenth Amendment: A
Conversation with Eric Foner, 6 NEV. L.J. 425, 428 (Winter 2005/2006) (arguing that the
Fourteenth Amendment established a principle of individual equality).
65. 164 U.S. 112 (1896).
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for the establishment of irrigation districts.66 In particular, the Court noted
the law satisfied a “public purpose” since “[i]t is not essential that the entire
community . . . should directly enjoy or participate in an improvement in
order to constitute a public use.”67 Later in Clark v. Nash,68 the Court cited
Bradley when holding a private individual could condemn a neighbor’s land
for irrigation purposes.69 In a later case, the Court relied on Clark when it
affirmed a mining corporation’s right to condemn property for an aerial
bucket line.70 There, the Court explained the “use by the general public”
test was inadequate for determining what constituted a public use.71
In Bradley, Clark, and Strickley, the Court acknowledged that
determining which activities qualified as public uses varied by location.72
The Court also mentioned efficiencies, worrying that not allowing the
takings would result in high transaction costs that could stunt economic
growth.73 Despite the prevailing rhetoric of individual rights,74 public
welfare concerns necessitated individual concessions.75 Notably, none of
these decisions engaged in a historical analysis to ascertain the original
meaning of public use to the founding generation.76
Fifty years later in Berman v. Parker,77 the Court, faced with the question
of whether urban redevelopment constituted a public use, echoed the same
concerns expressed earlier in Bradley, Clark, and Strickley. In particular,
the Court discussed the transaction costs associated with any
comprehensive redevelopment plan that could not rely on the power of
eminent domain.78 Citing these precedents, the Court upheld the taking for
the purpose of slum clearance.79
Specifically at issue in Berman was a challenge to the constitutionality of
legislation authorizing takings for the elimination of urban blight in

66. Id. at 160–61. The state constitution at issue provided that apportioning water,
including for use in irrigation, qualified as a public use. Id. at 159 (citing CAL. CONST. art.
10, § 5).
67. Id. at 161–62.
68. 198 U.S. 361 (1905).
69. Id. at 369–70. Like in Bradley, the Utah statute at issue in Clark authorized the
taking as satisfying a public use. Id.
70. Strickley v. Highland Boy Gold Mining Co., 200 U.S. 527, 529, 531 (1906).
Strickley concerned the same Utah statute at issue in Clark that considered takings furthering
mining activities public uses. Id. at 530–31.
71. Id. at 531.
72. Id.; Clark, 198 U.S. at 369; Bradley, 164 U.S. at 159–60.
73. Bradley, 164 U.S. at 161; see also infra notes 78, 84 (noting the Berman Court
mentioned the same transaction cost concerns).
74. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
75. Strickley, 200 U.S. at 531.
76. See, e.g., id. at 529–32 (noting that the question is answered by the Clark decision);
Clark, 198 U.S. at 367–70 (relying on Bradley when allowing the taking); Bradley, 164 U.S.
at 151–78 (failing to analyze the history of public use).
77. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
78. Id. at 33–35.
79. Id. In the 1950s, slum clearance was a national movement, and the Court cited
statistics suggesting the majority of the dwellings in the blighted area were uninhabitable. Id.
at 30.
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Washington, D.C.80 A department store owner located in the area slated for
redevelopment objected to the taking of his non-blighted property for
transfer to a private agency for eventual private use.81 In its opinion, the
Court held that improving public welfare satisfied the public use
requirement.82 As a result of the decision, the legislature could determine
the appropriate means by which to execute a redevelopment project.83 The
Court worried that if owners of non-blighted properties could successfully
resist takings, comprehensive community development plans would be
nearly impossible.84
When validating a taking for public welfare purposes in Berman, the
Court continued to rely on precedent to interpret the Public Use Clause.85
In its next public use challenge, the Court upheld legislation allowing a
private agency to use eminent domain to break up land oligopolies in
Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff.86 Whereas Berman repeated the
concerns regarding transaction costs discussed in earlier cases, Midkiff
echoed Berman’s deference to legislative determinations on public use.87
As before, the Midkiff Court did not explore the original meaning of the
Public Use Clause but rather relied on precedent. In defining public use,
the Court cited Berman for the proposition that legislative findings are
nearly sacrosanct.88 Specifically, when a legislature decides to exercise the
takings power, “courts must defer to its determination that the taking will
serve a public use.”89 Further, the Court noted that a private individual’s
possession of taken land does not necessarily render the taking nonpublic.90 Most importantly, the Court summed up the cases beginning with
Bradley when it stressed that it had “long ago rejected any literal
80. Berman, 348 U.S. at 28–30. The legislation created a private agency tasked with
using eminent domain to acquire property, after which the agency could transfer parcels to
private developers who promised to complete the approved redevelopment plan. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 33; see also Alberto B. Lopez, Weighing and Reweighing Eminent Domain’s
Political Philosophies Post-Kelo, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 237, 265 (2006) (noting that the
Court’s detailed description of the blight in Berman made it hard for critics to condemn the
opinion).
83. Berman, 348 U.S. at 34 (“We cannot say that public ownership is the sole method of
promoting the public purposes of community redevelopment projects.”).
84. Id. at 34–35; see also Ilya Somin, Controlling the Grasping Hand: Economic
Development Takings After Kelo, 15 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 183, 204 (2007) (noting that one
of the most common justifications for economic development takings is the difficulties
associated with assembling a large amount of property owned by numerous individuals,
some of whom may hold out and gain the power either to block a project or to extract a
prohibitively high price for the land).
85. See Berman, 348 U.S. at 33–36. The Berman Court saw the role of the judiciary in
policing the power of eminent domain as extremely narrow. Id. at 32.
86. 467 U.S. 229 (1984). In Hawaii, the Polynesian immigrants who settled the islands
created a system whereby the high chief controlled all land, doling it out to lower ranking
citizens. All land was eventually returned to the high chief, thus eliminating private
ownership. Id. at 232. As a result, land oligopolies prevailed into the twentieth century,
significantly increasing land prices and skewing the market for private property. Id.
87. Id. at 239–40, 244; see also supra note 85.
88. Id. at 239–40 (citing Berman, 348 U.S. at 32–33).
89. Id. at 244.
90. Id. at 243–44.
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requirement that condemned property be put into use for the general
public.”91
Midkiff held that takings, by private parties for the purpose of land
redistribution, did not constitute a naked transfer of property, thereby
setting the stage for Kelo.92 As compared to Berman, where the Court
associated the taking with increasing public welfare,93 Midkiff explicitly
addressed the meaning of public use when it rejected outright the literal
interpretation.94 When the Court discarded this narrow view, the opinion
relied on precedent, not a historical, structural, or textual analysis of public
use.95
B.

Kelo v. City of New London96

Similarly, in upholding the taking at issue, the Kelo majority relied on
public use precedent, rather than grounding the opinion in textual,
structural, or historical analyses.97 Justice O’Connor’s dissenting opinion
took a different approach, largely focusing on upholding Berman and
Midkiff while distinguishing Kelo.98 In contrast to the majority, however,
she did use historical evidence of original meaning to support her
argument.99 Finally, Justice Thomas’s dissent marked a departure in public
use jurisprudence by interpreting the Public Use Clause in a purely
originalist fashion.100
1.

The Majority Opinion

Residents of New London, Connecticut challenged the condemnation of
their homes pursuant to the city’s redevelopment plan, arguing that
economic development did not satisfy the Public Use Clause.101 In a five to
four decision, with a fifth-vote concurrence by Justice Kennedy, Justice
Stevens writing for the majority held that the eminent domain power
91. Id. at 244 (“[I]t is only the taking’s purpose, and not its mechanics, that must pass
scrutiny under the Public Use Clause.”). In his Kelo dissent, Justice Thomas agreed that the
Court had long ago rejected this literal requirement, but argued that adhering to this
precedent had divorced the public use case law from its original meaning. Kelo v. City of
New London, 545 U.S. 469, 514 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“The Court adopted its
modern reading blindly, with little discussion of the Clause’s history and original meaning . .
. in cases adopting the ‘public purpose’ interpretation . . . and . . . in cases deferring to
legislatures’ judgments regarding what constitutes a valid public purpose.”).
92. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
93. Berman, 348 U.S. at 33.
94. Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 243–44.
95. Id. As discussed above, Berman also relied on earlier cases that failed to analyze
original meaning. See supra text accompanying note 85.
96. 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
97. See infra Part II.B.1; see also infra note 158 (containing Justice Thomas’s
disapproval of the majority’s reliance on public use precedent).
98. See infra Part II.B.2.
99. See infra notes 124–27 and accompanying text.
100. See infra Part II.B.3.
101. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 475. After years of economic decline, Pfizer’s decision to open a
plant in the area spurred the project to capitalize on new jobs, tax revenue, and general urban
revitalization. Id. at 473–75.
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extended to takings for this purpose.102 In response, state legislatures
immediately passed new eminent domain legislation containing more
stringent limitations.103
In evaluating the plan’s constitutionality, the Court relied on the
Bradley,104 Clark,105 and Strickley106 precedents establishing the broad
public purpose standard, rather than the literal test of use by the public.107
Also citing the comprehensiveness of the redevelopment plan and the
deference to legislative determinations discussed in Berman and Midkiff,
the Court concluded that the economic development served a public
purpose, thereby satisfying the Fifth Amendment’s requirements.108
The majority began by noting that two propositions were clear: first, the
government could not take the property from A for the sole purpose of
transferring it to B, another private party,109 but second, the government
could transfer property from one private party to another if the taking’s
purpose were “use by the public.”110 Here, the Court explained that since
the takings were exacted pursuant to a “carefully considered” development
plan, the condemnations would not benefit a particular group of
individuals.111 The Court relied on Berman and Midkiff for the idea that
legislative determinations of the viability of a comprehensive plan, as
102. Id. at 489–90. Notably, the Court emphasized that the ruling did not limit the states
from placing greater restrictions on the takings power. Id. at 489; see also infra note 103 and
accompanying text.
103. See, e.g., James W. Ely, Jr., Post-Kelo Reform: Is the Glass Half Full or Half
Empty?, 17 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 127, 133 (2009) (stating that post-Kelo, only eight states
did not enact eminent domain reform that limited its exercise for economic development
purposes); Ilya Somin, The Limits of Backlash: Assessing the Political Response to Kelo, 93
MINN. L. REV. 2100, 2102 (2009) (noting that Kelo resulted in new eminent domain
legislation in forty-three states, a response greater than any other Supreme Court decision).
104. Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112 (1896).
105. Clark v. Nash, 198 U.S. 361 (1905).
106. Strickley v. Highland Boy Gold Mining Co., 200 U.S. 527 (1906).
107. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 480 & n.9 (citations omitted) (“[W]hen this Court began applying
the Fifth Amendment to the States at the close of the [nineteenth] century, it embraced the
broader and more natural interpretation of public use as ‘public purpose.’ . . . We have
repeatedly and consistently rejected that narrow test [of use by the public] ever since.”).
108. Id. at 484. The Court noted that its public use precedents had consistently deferred
to legislative judgments. Id. at 483 (“For more than a century, our public use jurisprudence
has wisely eschewed rigid formulas and intrusive scrutiny in favor of affording legislatures
broad latitude in determining what public needs justify the use of the takings power.”).
109. Here, the Court used the language of Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388–89
(1798). See infra notes 344, 425, 431 and accompanying text (discussing Calder in the
context of the Mill Act cases). Even though Kelo interpreted public use broadly, the naked
transfer of property discussed in Calder would still be unconstitutional according to the
majority. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 477.
110. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 477. In support of its second statement, the Court explained that
condemnation of land for railroads would be a common example of such a transfer. Id.
Justice Kennedy clarified in his concurrence that the state would not be allowed to take
private property under the pretext of public purpose. Id. at 491 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
For an analysis of pretext claims post-Kelo, see Daniel S. Hafetz, Note, Ferreting Out
Favoritism: Bringing Pretext Claims After Kelo, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 3095 (2009).
111. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 478 (quoting Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500, 536
(Conn. 2004), aff’d, 545 U.S. 469 (2005)). For this statement, the Court relied on the lower
court’s findings that there was no evidence of illegitimate purpose in the plan. Id.
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opposed to a piecemeal approach, would be respected.112 Further, even
though the plan would not open up all the condemned land to public use,
the Court cited Midkiff when rejecting the idea that the Takings Clause
required literal use by the public.113 If the Public Use Clause were read so
narrowly, the majority noted, takings would become not only “difficult to
administer” but also “impractical given the diverse and always evolving
needs of society.”114
Like the cases before it, the Kelo majority did not discuss any historical
interpretations of the Public Use Clause and instead cited prior public use
case law to support its holding.115 In contrast, both dissents invoked
originalist interpretations.
2.

Justice O’Connor’s Dissenting Opinion

Justice O’Connor, the author of the unanimous Midkiff opinion, dissented
in Kelo, arguing the majority had effectively removed the Public Use
Clause from the Fifth Amendment.116 Also beginning by invoking Justice
Samuel Chase’s admonition in Calder v. Bull117 that a law transferring
property from A to B could not be valid, Justice O’Connor viewed the
takings at issue in Kelo as falling neatly into that category of purely private
appropriations.118 She noted that, whereas Berman and Midkiff emphasized
the importance of legislative determinations of public purpose, in her view
the Court was equipped to determine that the taking here was purely
private.119
In contrast to the majority’s reliance on precedent, Justice O’Connor’s
dissent largely focused on the perceived practical ramifications of allowing
the taking at issue. Justice O’Connor would have invalidated it because
otherwise, she argued, all property would be threatened with
condemnation.120 If “positive side effects [were] enough to render transfer
from one private party to another constitutional,” then the Public Use
Clause would not exclude any takings since “any lawful use of real private
112. Id. at 480–82.
113. Id. at 478–79 (citing Haw. Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 244 (1984)). But
see Ely Jr., supra note 15, at 61 (discussing Justice Thomas’s disagreement with the Court’s
rejection of the literal interpretation); supra note 91 (same).
114. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 479.
115. Id. at 477–90.
116. Id. at 494 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia
and Thomas joined her dissent.
117. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798); see also supra note 109 and accompanying text.
118. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 494 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). After Berman and Midkiff, Justice
O’Connor argued that there could still be unconstitutional transfers from A to B, unlike after
the majority’s decision in Kelo, which she viewed as sanctioning purely private property
transfers. Id. at 504. For a discussion of Calder, see infra notes 344, 425, 431 and
accompanying text.
119. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 499–500 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
120. Id. at 503 (“For who among us can say she already makes the most productive or
attractive possible use of her property? . . . Nothing is to prevent the State from replacing
any Motel 6 with a Ritz-Carlton, any home with a shopping mall, or any farm with a
factory.”).
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property [could] be said to generate some incidental benefit to the
public.”121
In an effort to preserve the rule of Berman and Midkiff, however, she
identified three categories of takings allowed under the Fifth Amendment:
transfer of private property to public ownership, transfer of private property
to private parties who make the property available for public use, and in
some circumstances, takings that serve a public purpose, even if the
property will not be used by the public.122 Since a literal interpretation of
public use was sometimes “too constricting and impractical,” the third
category would preserve Berman and Midkiff by allowing takings for
private use in certain circumstances.123
Finally, Justice O’Connor invoked a historical argument, echoing James
Madison’s justifications for proposing the Takings Clause,124 by explaining
that the public use requirement was originally intended to protect the
security of property against majoritarian overreaching.125 Specifically,
Justice O’Connor quoted James Madison: “[T]hat alone is a just
government . . . which impartially secures to every man, whatever is his
own.”126 By ignoring this limitation, Justice O’Connor concluded, the Kelo
majority was not faithful to the original meaning of the Public Use Clause,
which would have prohibited a purely private taking.127
3.

Justice Thomas’s Dissenting Opinion

Justice Thomas—in a dissent joined by no other member of the Court—
criticized Kelo’s holding, arguing the Public Use Clause historically
provided a meaningful limit on the eminent domain power128 and accused
the majority of replacing it with a “Diverse and Always Evolving Needs of
Society Clause.”129 Using a strictly originalist argument, Justice Thomas
presented structural, textual, and historical evidence to assert the
121. Id. at 501.
122. Id. at 497–98. Justice O’Connor listed roads, hospitals, and military bases as
satisfying the first category and railroads, public utilities, and sports stadiums as satisfying
the second. Id.
123. Id. In those cases, Justice O’Connor argued that because the takings directly
benefitted the public by eliminating “harmful” uses, subsequent private use of the property
was irrelevant. Id. at 500. The majority opinion criticized Justice O’Connor’s distinction by
insisting that there was nothing harmful about the use of property for a non-blighted
department store in Berman or for mining or agriculture in the earlier cases. Id. at 486 n.16
(majority opinion).
124. See infra notes 281–83 and accompanying text.
125. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 496 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Alexander Hamilton’s
speech to the Philadelphia Convention on June 19, 1787 in which he asserted that “the
security of Property” is “one great obj[ec]t of Gov[ernmen]t” (1 THE RECORDS OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 302 (Max Farrand, ed. 1911))).
126. Id. at 505 (quoting James Madison, Property, NAT’L GAZETTE, Mar. 27, 1792,
reprinted in 14 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 266, 266 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds.,
1983)) [hereinafter 14 MADISON PAPERS]; see also infra notes 299–302 and accompanying
text.
127. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 505 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
128. Id. at 506 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
129. Id.
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Constitution only authorized a taking if the public could use the property,
not if it realized a benefit from the taking.130
Justice Thomas began by examining the definition of “use” in Samuel
Johnson’s A Dictionary of the English Language, concluding the word
meant “[t]he act of employing any thing to any purpose” at the time of the
drafting of the Fifth Amendment.131 Accordingly, he argued, a transfer of
property to a private individual without a right of public use strained the
definition of “use,” even if the public benefited incidentally from the
taking.132
Structurally, Justice Thomas asserted that the Public Use Clause limited
the takings power.133 Specifically, the words “for public use,” would be
surplusage otherwise,134 especially since, in his view, the Takings Clause
was not a grant of power to the government but rather a restriction on the
use of its power.135 Approaching the structural argument from another
angle, Justice Thomas also compared the words “for public use” to the other
two appearances of “use” in the Constitution136 in Article I, Section 8,137
and Article I, Section 10.138 In both instances, Justice Thomas asserted that
the document utilized “use” in a narrow sense, not a broad one.139 He next
contrasted these appearances of “use” to the term “general Welfare”
appearing elsewhere in the Constitution,140 arguing that the founders would
130. See id. at 506–14. In his dissent, Justice Thomas alternated between requiring the
public’s actual use of the property and its legal right to use the property. Compare id. at 508
(“[T]he public has a legal right to use . . . the property . . . .”), and id. at 521 (“[T]he public
has a legal right to use the taken property . . . .”), with id. at 521 (“[T]he government may
take property only if it actually uses or gives the public a legal right to use the property.”)
(emphasis added). Actual use is a far more stringent requirement than legal use; property the
public has a legal right to use can be put to purely private uses. See David L. Breau, Justice
Thomas’ Kelo Dissent, or “History as a Grab Bag of Principles,” 38 MCGEORGE L. REV.
373, 375 n.20 (2007). This Note focuses on the actual use requirement.
131. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 508 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting 2 SAMUEL JOHNSON, A
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 2194 (4th ed. 1773)). Justice Thomas later
conceded that Johnson’s Dictionary listed multiple definitions of “use,” including entries
defining the word more broadly. See id. at 509; see also infra notes 169–71 and
accompanying text (listing all nine definitions of “use” in Johnson’s Dictionary).
132. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 508 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
133. Id. at 507.
134. Id. (“‘It cannot be presumed that any clause in the constitution is intended to be
without effect.’” (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174 (1803))).
135. Id. at 511.
136. Id. at 509.
137. Article I, Section 8, Clause 12 grants Congress the power “[t]o raise and support
Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two
Years.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12 (emphasis added).
138. “[T]he net Produce of all Duties and Imposts, laid by any State on Imports or
Exports, shall be for the Use of the Treasury of the United States.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10,
cl. 2 (emphasis added).
139. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 509 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
140. U.S. CONST. pmbl. (“We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more
perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common
defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and
our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.”)
(emphasis added); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (“The Congress shall have Power to . . .
provide for the . . . general Welfare of the United States.”) (emphasis added).
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have used this broader term if public benefit were the only limitation on the
takings power.141
After his structural and textual analysis, Justice Thomas analyzed early
common law142 and state eminent domain decisions143 to support the idea
that the original meaning of public use was not synonymous with public
benefit. For Justice Thomas, the founding generation embraced the
classically liberal tradition of protecting fundamental rights, including the
right to property, from government appropriation.144 Relying on William
Blackstone, Justice Thomas discussed English common law’s prohibition
against taking private property solely for the purposes of public benefit.145
Additionally, Justice Thomas, like the majority and Justice O’Connor, cited
the Calder language to insist that the founding generation thought the
government could not effect a purely private transfer.146
Examining early state decisions regarding the constitutionality of the Mill
Acts,147 Justice Thomas argued that the statutes largely comported with the
theory that public use originally limited the takings power.148 He
distinguished unfavorable case law149 by arguing that the presence of
statutes requiring the flour mills to remain open to the public rendered the
Clause satisfied.150 To explain the later extension of the Mill Acts to
entirely private entities not open to the public, Justice Thomas contended

141. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 509 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
142. See infra Parts IV.A.3, IV.B.3.
143. See infra Part V.
144. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 511–12 (Thomas, J., dissenting). See infra Part IV.A.1 for a
discussion of classical liberalism.
145. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 510 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“So great . . . is the regard of the law
for private property, that it will not authorize the least violation of it; no, not even for the
general good of the whole community.” (quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
*135)). But see infra text accompanying notes 256–59 (discussing Blackstone’s
acknowledgement of the legislature’s power to use eminent domain without articulating a
substantive limit).
146. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 510–11 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3
Dall.) 386, 400 (1798)). Contrary to the majority, Justice Thomas considered Calder’s
proscription applicable to all purely private takings, regardless of whether any incidental
public benefit accrued. For the majority, the Public Use Clause would only proscribe private
takings if no substantial public benefit occurred as a result. See supra note 109 and
accompanying text.
147. The term “Mill Acts” refers in aggregate to several state and local statutes in the late
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries allowing owners of water-powered mills to flood or
condemn upstream lands if the owners paid the affected landowners just compensation. See
infra Part V.A (explaining that early courts were inconsistent about their approaches to these
statutes).
148. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 511–14 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
149. Unfavorable for Justice Thomas were Mill Act cases in which courts interpreted
public use limitations broadly and upheld takings under the statutes. See infra Part V.A.1.
150. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 511–14 (Thomas, J., dissenting). But see Boston & Roxbury
Mill Corp. v. Newman, 29 Mass. (12 Pick.) 467, 481 (1832) (holding that the Mill Act
satisfied the Public Use Clause, even though the statute did not require the mill to allow
public access); infra note 388 (explaining that only some states had statutes requiring mill
owners to allow the public to use the facilities).
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that those instances were too far removed temporally from the founding to
be probative of the original meaning of the Public Use Clause.151
Finally, Justice Thomas argued that the Court abandoned the original
meaning of the Public Use Clause when it adopted a public benefit
interpretation, deferring to legislative judgments of what satisfied this
limitation.152 Justice Thomas insisted that it would be inappropriate for the
Court to defer to a legislative determination of a quintessentially legal
question.153 Additionally, he argued that the “public purpose” test began as
dicta in Bradley,154 and the Court subsequently followed the test blindly
without thorough analysis.155 Justice Thomas insisted that this public
purpose test could not be applied in a principled manner, thus providing no
coherent limiting principle to the takings power.156 Specifically, he took
issue with the last century of Public Use jurisprudence as “wholly divorced
from the text, history, and structure of our founding document.”157 To
remedy the problem, Justice Thomas advocated overruling precedent and
returning to his view of the original meaning of the Public Use Clause by
requiring taken land to be actually used by the public.158
III. THE TEXT AND STRUCTURE OF THE PUBLIC USE CLAUSE
Textual analysis is an important tool used by originalists to analyze the
Constitution.159 Many judges and scholars begin a search for original
meaning by closely scrutinizing the Constitutional text in question,
including researching historical word definitions and comparing a clause’s
terms to other parts of the document.160 Accordingly, Part III begins by
providing background on how to determine what words meant in
151. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 513 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
He explained that the
constitutionality of these private takings were contested in courts, with some courts
authorizing takings for public purposes and others adhering to a narrow view of public use.
Id. at 513 & n.2 (comparing Dayton Gold & Silver Mining Co., 11 Nev. 394, 409–10 (1876),
a case that upheld the broad interpretation of public use as public benefit, with nine cases
decided between 1832 and 1907 adhering to requiring actual use by the public). But see infra
notes 382–84 and accompanying text (discussing an 1814 case interpreting the public use
language broadly); infra notes 365–67 (noting that all Mill Act citations are susceptible to
temporal criticism).
152. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 514–15 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
153. Id. at 517–18 (observing that courts would not defer to the legislature on other
Constitutional questions such as whether a search of a home would be reasonable, when a
prisoner could be shackled during sentencing, or if the Due Process Clause protects
property).
154. See, e.g., id. at 515 (“[T]o bring into possible cultivation, these large masses of
otherwise worthless lands, would seem to be a public purpose, and a matter of public interest
. . . .” (quoting Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112, 161–62 (1896))).
155. Id. at 516.
156. Id. at 520.
157. Id. at 523.
158. Id. (“The Court relies almost exclusively on this Court’s prior cases to derive today’s
far-reaching, and, dangerous, result. . . . When faced with a clash of constitutional principle
and a line of unreasoned cases . . . we should not hesitate to resolve the tension in favor of
the Constitution’s original meaning.”).
159. See supra note 37.
160. See Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 38, at 553.
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contemporary eighteenth century usage.161 It concludes by detailing the
arguments advanced by scholars who prefer a broad interpretation of the
Clause and those who favor a narrow one.162
A.

The Definition of “Use” in the Eighteenth Century

Engaging in a close reading of the Public Use Clause requires
contemporary dictionaries from the founding generation. Samuel Johnson’s
A Dictionary of the English Language was the most important source of
such definitions from its first printing in 1755 until the latter part of the
nineteenth century.163 Indeed, Americans at the time of the founding relied
on Johnson’s work as a seminal authority on language.164 Thus, Johnson’s
Dictionary is the standard source for ascertaining word definitions at the
time of the drafting and ratification of the Constitution and Bill of
Rights.165
Before Johnson began his dictionary, he created a comprehensive plan
detailing how he would accomplish the project, which included an
explanation of how he would determine the order of definitions for a given
word.166 The first definition would have a word’s “natural and primitive
signification,” followed by its consequential, metaphorical, comparative,
poetical, and peculiar meanings, in that order.167 To illustrate the
definitions, Johnson also included quotations from writers who used or
introduced particular words.168
The third edition of Samuel Johnson’s A Dictionary of the English
Language, published in 1766, provides nine definitions for the noun
“use.”169 The first definition is, “The act of employing any thing to any
purpose.”170 In order, the other definitions listed for the word “use” are:
“Qualities that make a thing proper for any purpose,” “Need of; occasion on
which a thing can be employed,” “Advantage received; power of receiving

161. See infra Part III.A.
162. See infra Part III.B–D.
163. HENRY HITCHINGS, DR JOHNSON’S DICTIONARY: THE EXTRAORDINARY STORY OF THE
BOOK THAT DEFINED THE WORLD 2 (2005). Although there were other dictionaries at the
time, “In the second half of the eighteenth century, and for most of the nineteenth, [the
dictionary] enjoyed totemic status in both Britain and America.” Id. Indeed, “for 150 years
‘the dictionary’ meant Johnson’s Dictionary.” Id.
164. Id. at 230.
165. Id.
166. SAMUEL JOHNSON, THE PLAN OF A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1747),
available at http://andromeda.rutgers.edu/~jlynch/Texts/plan.html.
167. Id.
168. Id.; see also HITCHINGS, supra note 163, at 95.
169. 2 SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (3d ed. 1766).
170. Id. This first definition has “Locke” written next to it. Id. In his Kelo dissent, Justice
Thomas cites the fourth edition of Johnson’s Dictionary, published in 1773, which has an
identical first definition of “use.” See supra note 131 and accompanying text. Justice
Thomas also notes additional definitions of “use” in the 1773 dictionary that are identical to
the 1766 version: “‘[c]onvenience’ or ‘help’” and “‘[q]ualities that make a thing proper for
any purpose.’” Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 509 (2005) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
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advantage,” “Convenience; help,” “Usage; customary act,” “Practice;
habit,” and “Custom; common occurrence.”171
B.

Broad Interpretations of the Text and Structure of the Public Use
Clause

When examining text and structure, some scholarship concludes that the
Public Use Clause should not be read literally. Indeed, looking at
Johnson’s definition of “use” shows that the word’s first, “natural”
definition actually includes the idea of “purpose.”172 One commentator
pointed out that using this definition to construe public use narrowly
requires focusing only on the first half of the definition—the “act of
employing”—thereby excluding the last half that specifically mentions
“purpose.”173
Further, textual interpretations often ignore the multiple definitions of
“use” in the Dictionary. Even though Johnson’s first definition supposedly
contained the word’s most natural and significant meaning, the founding
generation might have understood the phrase to be referring to one of the
eight other definitions of the word,174 especially since no other definition of
“use” would necessarily exclude a broad public purpose interpretation.175
Structurally, the word “use” appears two other times in the
Constitution.176 In response to those who compare its appearance in the
Public Use Clause to these instances in the Constitution,177 Dean William
Michael Treanor insists that interpreting Constitutional structure in this
manner can be misleading.178 By restricting the comparison of “use” to its
appearances in the Constitution, one forgoes an opportunity to examine the
word’s usage in other eighteenth century sources.179 Another scholar
agrees that the comparison could be misleading as there is no evidence
supporting the notion that the drafters of the Constitution saw themselves as
using terms of art.180 Rather, the Constitution was written in simple
language that everyone could understand.181

171. 2 JOHNSON, supra note 169.
172. See supra notes 167, 170 and accompanying text.
173. Breau, supra note 130, at 376 (arguing that it is hard to defend a literal interpretation
of public use with a definition that “itself defines ‘use’ in terms of ‘purpose’”).
174. Breau, supra note 130, at 376–77 & n.38 (“For a word such as ‘use’ that has nine
definitions, order alone does not indicate how significant or common each definition was at
that time.”).
175. See supra text accompanying note 171.
176. See supra notes 137–38 and accompanying text.
177. See, e.g., supra notes 136–39 and infra notes 188–89 and accompanying text.
178. Treanor, supra note 31, at 523–24.
179. Id.
180. Shaun A. Goho, Process-Oriented Review and the Original Understanding of the
Public Use Requirement, 38 SW. U. L. REV. 37, 47 n.50 (2008).
181. Id.
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Narrow Interpretations of the Text and Structure of the Public Use
Clause

Other scholarship concludes that the text and structure of the Public Use
Clause require a narrow reading instead. Such an interpretation, according
to this school, conforms more closely to the historical, as well as modern,
meaning of the term.182 In particular, Professor Eric Claeys cites Johnson’s
primary definition of “use,” combined with Johnson’s definition of “public”
as “[b]elonging to a state or nation; not private,”183 to assert that the Clause
“requires the public to employ the asset in question, and do so for ends
chosen by the public.”184 Through examining the definitions of both
“public” and “use” together, instead of exclusively focusing on the word
“use,” he argues that the combination of meanings necessarily excludes the
idea of private use.185
Structurally, by comparing the appearances of the word “use” in the
Constitution, Professor Claeys insists that Article I, Section 8186 and Article
I, Section 10187 both contemplate an idea of “use” that does not include the
Specifically, these provisions direct
concept of “purpose.”188
appropriations of money, and the text intends for the U.S. Army and the
U.S. Treasury, respectively, to direct the employment of the funds, rather
than having the funds spent on purposes only secondarily useful to the
institutions.189 Thus, from a comparative structural perspective, he argues
the Public Use Clause should be interpreted more narrowly in accordance
with those other clauses in the Constitution.190
D.

Comparing the Broad and Narrow Interpretations

When originalist scholars closely examine the text of the Public Use
Clause to determine whether its original meaning contemplated the idea of
public benefit, the primary eighteenth century definition actually defined
“use” in terms of “purpose.”191 In contrast to Justice Scalia’s assertion that
words frequently have an easily discernable meaning,192 identical
dictionary definitions lead scholars to substantially different conclusions.193
182. See, e.g., Eric R. Claeys, Public-Use Limitations and Natural Property Rights, 2004
MICH. ST. L. REV. 877, 896.
183. 2 JOHNSON, supra note 169.
184. Claeys, supra note 182, at 896. Professor Claeys does admit, like scholars who
argue for a broad interpretation, that the word “use” also had several other meanings
according to Johnson’s Dictionary and other eighteenth century sources, including several
definitions closer to the idea of purpose. Id.
185. Id.
186. See supra note 137.
187. See supra note 138.
188. Claeys, supra note 182, at 897.
189. Id.
190. Id.; see also supra note 40 (explaining that if text is ambiguous, an interpretation that
harmonizes it with the rest of the Constitution is preferred).
191. See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
192. See supra notes 40–41 and accompanying text
193. Compare supra note 173 and accompanying text, with supra notes 184–85 and
accompanying text.
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Those advancing a broad interpretation argue that a strict limit cannot be
found if “use” and “purpose” are essentially synonymous.194 On the other
hand, those interpreting public use narrowly take an entirely different
approach, combining the meanings of “use” and “public” to argue that,
when read together, the resulting definition explicitly proscribes private
uses.195
Structural interpretations pose similar difficulties, especially as scholars
do not even agree that a Constitutional comparison is an appropriate method
of analysis.196 These textual and structural analyses of the Public Use
Clause do not clarify what limitation, if any, the founding generation saw in
the Clause. When faced with inconsistent evidence from these sources,
originalists next examine the historical record to ascertain what early
Americans would have understood the Clause to mean at the time of its
drafting and ratification.
IV. THE HISTORY OF PUBLIC USE IN AMERICA
Part IV provides the historical background on which originalist scholars
and jurists rely.197 To shed light on the original meaning of public use, Part
IV recounts the philosophies and ideologies important to the founding
generation as well as early American attitudes towards property, including a
discussion of the details of the drafting and ratification of the Takings
Clause.198 For the originalist, examining this type of historical evidence
reveals the context through which the Public Use Clause would have been
understood in the late eighteenth century.199 Finally, Part IV closes by
examining how modern scholars have interpreted the historical evidence to
support either a broad or narrow interpretation of public use limitations.200
A.

Legal and Ideological Influences on the Founding Generation

The values held by early Americans influence how scholars interpret the
original public meaning of Constitutional text.201 Two dominant political
philosophies of the late eighteenth century—classical liberalism and
classical republicanism—espoused contradictory ways of interpreting the
individual’s relationship to the state and the legislature’s ability to act on
behalf of the citizens, key questions in evaluating what public use
limitations could have meant to members of the founding generation.
194. See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
195. See supra notes 184–85 and accompanying text.
196. See supra notes 178–81 and accompanying text.
197. Since the text of the Public Use Clause does not explicitly require actual use of
condemned land, see supra Part III, originalist scholars also examine historical sources to
ascertain the original meaning of the words to the founding generation. See Calabresi &
Prakash, supra note 38, at 553; Rappaport, supra note 38, at 1494.
198. See infra Part IV.A–B.
199. Rappaport, supra note 38, at 1493–94 (explaining originalist methodology).
200. See infra Part IV.C–E.
201. See, e.g., infra notes 342–44 and accompanying text (noting that scholars who
interpret the Public Use Clause narrowly often cite John Locke as an inspiration to the
founding generation).
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Professor Margaret Jane Radin described the difference between the
ideologies succinctly when she noted, “If we see the government as ‘them’
we adopt a ‘liberal’ theory of politics, and if we see the government as ‘us’
we adopt a ‘republican’ theory of politics.”202 For Professor Radin,
viewing the government as “them” embodies the liberal ideal of protecting
individual rights from exploitation, while viewing the government as “us”
illustrates the republican ideal of promoting the common good over
individual benefit.203 Professor Radin’s distinction also encapsulates the
differences in how the philosophies interpreted the role of the legislature.
For example, republicans conceived of the body as effectively representing
all citizens204 while liberals were more skeptical, requiring the consent of
the populace to validate legislative acts.205
Recent historical scholarship has stressed that a single major
philosophical paradigm did not dominate political thought at the time of the
drafting and ratification of the Bill of Rights.206 Indeed, both philosophies
influenced the founding generation’s concept of property rights.207 The
following two sections explore classical liberalism and republicanism in
their most straightforward form, even though, in practice, members of the
public were not purists in either ideology. Finally, this section closes with a
discussion of English common law’s prohibitions on the expropriation of
private property—another significant influence on the founding generation.
1.

Classical Liberalism and the Importance of Individual Rights

Stated simply, classical liberalism promoted an individual’s self-interest
over that of the common good.208 Liberals asserted that since individual
rights existed pre-politically, a legitimate government could never abrogate
them.209 Early American liberals viewed natural rights and the social
contract as key concepts in political thought.210
202. Margaret Jane Radin, The Liberal Conception of Property: Cross Currents in the
Jurisprudence of Takings, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1667, 1693 (1988).
203. Id.
204. See infra notes 234–35 and accompanying text.
205. See infra note 218 and accompanying text.
206. R.B. BERNSTEIN, THE FOUNDING FATHERS RECONSIDERED 34 (2009) (“In their
attempts to interpret the American Enlightenment, modern historians often seek to assert the
primacy of one or another body of thought or experience . . . . It is all but impossible to
make a convincing case for any single candidate . . . .”); DAVID A. SCHULTZ, PROPERTY,
POWER, AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 12 (1992) (“[A] thinker of the [founding generation]
could even be attracted simultaneously to contradictory or even mutually exclusive
concepts.”); Treanor, supra note 6, at 823 (“[T]here is now near consensus that both
republican and liberal ideas powerfully influenced American politics during the 1780s and
1790s.”).
207. Lopez, supra note 82, at 245 (“The influences of these competing theories,
republicanism and liberalism, pervade the theoretical and jurisprudential history of eminent
domain.”); see also Treanor, supra note 6, at 823; infra notes 281–83 and accompanying text
(noting James Madison’s writings employed a mix of both philosophies).
208. Treanor, supra note 6, at 821.
209. Id.; see also infra note 212 and accompanying text.
210. See BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 45
(1992).
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Greatly influencing the founding generation’s liberal ideology, John
Locke’s theories specifically addressed these issues.211 For Locke, a “State
of Nature” existed prior to government wherein all men were equal,
possessed equal rights, and remained subject to natural law.212 The
shortcomings of this State of Nature would lead to uncertainty and limited
protection for individual rights and private property.213 In exchange for
remedying these deficiencies, individuals would surrender some of their
liberties to the civil government.214 Protection of property was key to
understanding why individuals submitted to the state: “The great and chief
end therefore, of Mens uniting into Commonwealths, and putting
themselves under Government, is the Preservation of their Property.”215
The development and enforcement of the law—shortcomings in the prepolitical state—would be the responsibility of the government.216 Although
Locke saw the legislature as the most important component of the state,217
he also noted legislative acts required the consent of citizens, either directly
or through their representatives, to be valid.218 Early Americans drew on
Locke’s social compact theory in the years following the Revolution to
explain and to justify their new form of government.219
As for property, liberals viewed it as an essential individual right.220
Indeed, while the legislature could exercise eminent domain,221 liberal

211. Id. at 27 (“American writers cited Locke on natural rights and on the social and
government contract . . . .”); Stephen A. Siegel, The Marshall Court and Republicanism, 67
TEX. L. REV 903, 913 & n.76 (1989) (reviewing G. EDWARD WHITE, HISTORY OF THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: THE MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE
1815–35 (1988)) (explaining historians have used the phrase “John Locke et praeterea nihil”
—“Through John Locke and no other teachers”—to describe the liberal philosophy
associated with the American Revolution).
212. JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT (1690), reprinted in JOHN
LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT § 4–15 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press
1967). In this State of Nature, Locke proposed that individuals could acquire private
property by intermixing their individual labor with communal property. Id. at § 26–27.
213. Jeffrey M. Gaba, John Locke and the Meaning of the Takings Clause, 72 MO. L.
REV. 525, 545 (2007).
214. LOCKE, supra note 212, at § 123 (“[T]he enjoyment of the property he has in this
state [of nature] is very unsafe, very insecure. This makes him willing to quit a Condition,
which however free, is full of fears and continual dangers . . . he seeks out, and is willing to
joyn in Society with others . . . for the mutual Preservation of their Lives, Liberties and
Estates, which I call by the general Name, Property.”). It is essential to note that Locke’s
definition of property was not limited to a physicalist conception of land or material
possessions; rather Locke used the term to describe the set of rights held in the state of
nature as something “which Men have in their Persons as well as Goods.” Id. at § 173.
215. Id. at § 124.
216. Id. at § 131.
217. Id. at § 134 (describing the legislature as “the supream power of the Commonwealth”).
218. Id. at § 138–40, 142; see also infra notes 221–23 and accompanying text.
219. GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776–1787, at 283
(1998) (“[O]nly such a Lockean contract, seemed to make sense of their rapidly developing
idea of a constitution as a fundamental law designed by the people to be separate from and
controlling of all the institutions of government.”).
220. See id. at 219; see also Ely Jr., supra note 15, at 40 (“[The Framers] felt that
property rights and liberty were indissolubly linked.”).
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thought placed restrictions on the power by requiring legislative
prerogatives to serve legitimate ends.222 For example, an act that violated
the principles of the social compact would be void.223 To justify these
property expropriations—that is, instances when the state abrogated a prepolitical right—liberals turned to the compensation principle. Accordingly,
in a liberal view, government could only legitimately expropriate property
by compensating the individual for his loss.224 Like the compensation
principle, liberals might have also viewed public use as a similar constraint
in order to preserve and protect individual rights.225
2.

Classical Republicanism and the Importance of the Common Good

Classical republicanism looked to antiquity, particularly the Roman
republic, for inspiration.226 Ultimately, the philosophy concluded that the
ancient republics had been destroyed from within by “luxury” and “love of
refinement,” rather than from outside invasions.227 This led early
republicans to envision a society in which members would sacrifice
personal concerns for the benefit of the common good.228 In contrast to
liberalism’s emphasis on the individual, republicanism stressed the benefit
of all citizens.229
221. See WOOD, supra note 219, at 404 (noting that property could be taken from an
individual with his consent or that of his elected representative); see also infra notes 246,
308 and accompanying text (explaining common law restrictions on the legislative exercise
of eminent domain).
222. Gaba, supra note 213, at 563.
223. See WOOD, supra note 219, at 404–05; see also infra note 344 (explaining Justice
Samuel Chase’s similar admonition in Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798)).
224. WOOD, supra note 219, at 405; GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION 322 (1991) [hereinafter WOOD, RADICALISM].
225. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT
DOMAIN 15 (1985); Ely Jr., supra note 15, at 54 (“Consistent with their high regard for
private property as the bedrock of individual liberties, the Framers of the Bill of Rights
restricted the exercise of eminent domain by imposing the ‘public use’ and ‘just
compensation’ constraints in the Fifth Amendment.”); infra notes 342–44 and accompanying
text (discussing scholarship asserting that liberals would have considered public use to be an
explicit limitation on the takings power).
226. BAILYN, supra note 210, at 25; WOOD, supra note 219, at 49–51. In particular, the
founders focused specifically on Roman writers who discussed the empire’s corruption and
subsequent decline. WOOD, supra note 219, at 51.
227. WOOD, supra note 219, at 52–53; see also BAILYN, supra note 210, at 25–26
(“[American colonists] saw their own provincial virtues—rustic and old-fashioned, sturdy
and effective—challenged by the corruption at the center of power, by the threat of tyranny,
and by a constitution gone wrong.”).
228. WOOD, supra note 219, at 53.
229. See, e.g., id. at 53–54 (“The sacrifice of individual interests to the greater good of the
whole formed the essence of republicanism and comprehended for Americans the idealistic
goal of their Revolution. . . . in which the common good would be the only objective of
government.”); Treanor, supra note 6, at 821 (noting that republican theory emphasized that
individual rights are subject to the interests of the common good); Nathan Alexander Sales,
Note, Classical Republicanism and the Fifth Amendment’s “Public Use” Requirement, 49
DUKE L.J. 339, 350 (1999) (explaining that republicans believed the government’s primary
object was to advance the “res publica,” or common good); William Michael Treanor, Note,
The Origins and Original Significance of the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth
Amendment, 94 YALE L.J. 694, 699 (1985) [hereinafter Treanor, Note] (arguing that the

2010]

RECONCILING ORIGINALISM

291

Whether the achievement of this benefit required the subordination of
individual interests to those of society230 or rather active participation in
public affairs,231 republicans thought that the public had a single, easily
ascertainable common good.232 Accordingly, “what was good for the
whole community was ultimately good for all the parts.”233 Since
individual interests were always subordinate to the public good, legislative
acts could also be expected to reflect these overarching societal goals.234
Republicans of the founding generation would likely have deferred to
legislative determinations.235
Regarding private property specifically, republican views reflected two
different goals.236 On one hand, republicans saw property as potentially
antithetical to the promotion of the public good, remaining skeptical of the
pursuit of economic self-interest.237 On the other, republicans also thought
of property—specifically land—as a prerequisite for participation in
government, largely because of the independence of landowners from those
without such economic security.238 Such ownership in land, they believed,
enabled citizens to make objective political decisions.239
Applying the ideas espoused by classical republicanism and liberalism to
the text of the Takings Clause potentially shows what early Americans
would have understood public use to mean. For example, the Takings
Clause reflects two important republican goals: self-denial for the good of
the society and deference to legislative determinations.240 In this vein, the
Public Use Clause could simply reflect the republican goal of contributing
to and promoting the common good.241

republican ideology centered on a belief in the common good and the idea of society as “an
organic whole”).
230. WOOD, supra note 219, at 53–54.
231. Siegel, supra note 211, at 916.
232. WOOD, supra note 219, at 57–58.
233. Id. at 58. Professor Gordon Wood further noted that, “Ideally, republicanism
obliterated the individual.” Id. at 61.
234. Lopez, supra note 82, at 244; Treanor, Note, supra note 229, at 700–01 (“As the
voice of the people, the legislature could be trusted to perceive the common good and to
define the limits of individual rights.”).
235. Lopez, supra note 82, at 244.
236. Treanor, supra note 6, at 821.
237. Siegel, supra note 211, at 920; Treanor, supra note 6, at 821; see also supra text
accompanying note 227.
238. WOOD, RADICALISM, supra note 224, at 234, 269; Siegel, supra note 211, at 920;
Treanor, supra note 6, at 821; Sales, supra note 229, at 355-56; Treanor, Note, supra note
229, at 699.
239. WOOD, RADICALISM, supra note 224, at 269 (“Landed property was the most
important such guarantee of autonomy because it was the least transitory, the most
permanent form, of property. Such proprietary property was designed to protect its holders
from external influence or corruption, to free them from the scramble of buying and selling,
and to allow them to make impartial political judgments.”).
240. Lopez, supra note 82, at 247, 250 (“The public use clause reflects republicanism: an
individual property owner is required to sacrifice her property interest for the good of the
public at the request of the government if the property taken is to be put to a ‘public use.’”).
241. See supra notes 228–29 and accompanying text.
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On the other hand, the Just Compensation Clause is more likely to have
Indeed, requiring
been justified on classically liberal grounds.242
compensation for expropriated property reflected this ideology by requiring
the government to acknowledge an individual’s sacrifice.243 Accordingly,
the Public Use Clause may also have been an additional method of
protecting individual rights against state interference.244
3.

Influences from English Common Law

In addition to liberal and republican philosophies, English common law’s
limitations on eminent domain provide important background when seeking
to understand the founding generation’s view on property expropriations.
In his eighteenth-century treatise on the common law, William Blackstone
directly addressed these limitations on the individual right of private
property.245 Specifically, Blackstone noted that the legislature had the
exclusive right to exercise the power of eminent domain: “[When land is
required] the legislature alone can . . . interpose, and compel the individual
to acquiesce. . . . All that the legislature does is to oblige the owner to
alienate his possessions for a reasonable price; and even this is an exertion
of power . . . which nothing but the legislature can perform.”246
While acknowledging the legislature possessed the power of eminent
domain, Blackstone simultaneously echoed the protections of the Magna
Carta for private property247 and classical liberal sentiment regarding the
importance of individual rights248 when stating, “So great . . . is the regard
of the law for private property, that it will not authorize the least violation
of it; no, not even for the general good of the whole community.”249
In England, while the Magna Carta generally prohibited the Crown from
taking private property,250 important exceptions did exist in which the
monarch could expropriate land.251 Technically speaking, though, the
242. See supra note 224 and accompanying text.
243. Lopez, supra note 82, at 247–48.
244. See supra note 225 and accompanying text.
245. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 145, at *134–36. Blackstone defined property as “free
use, enjoyment, and disposal of all his acquisitions, without any control or diminution, save
only by the laws of the land.” Id. at *134.
246. Id. at *135 (emphasis added). Blackstone also noted that eminent domain is a power
“the legislature indulges with caution.” Id.
247. MAGNA CARTA, cl. 39 (1215), reprinted in SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES:
DOCUMENTARY ORIGINS OF INDIVIDUAL LIBERTIES IN THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND
BILL OF RIGHTS 11, 17 (Richard L. Perry & John C. Cooper eds., 1991) [hereinafter SOURCES
OF OUR LIBERTIES] (“No free man shall be . . . dispossessed . . . except by the legal judgment
of his peers or by the law of the land.”).
248. See supra Part IV.A.1.
249. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 145, at *135; see also supra note 145 and accompanying
text (explaining that Justice Thomas also relies on this quote in his Kelo dissent). To explain
this statement, Blackstone offered an example of building a new road through private
property, which would be beneficial to the public, but noted “the law permits no man . . . to
do this without consent of the owner of the land.” 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 145, at *135.
250. See supra note 247; see also 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 145, at *135.
251. For example, the King could use a subject’s property when it was necessary for the
realm’s defense or if he could assert superior title. See Matthew P. Harrington, “Public Use”
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Crown could not actually take title to seized property.252 As explained
above, the power to divest an owner of title to property resided in
When Blackstone confirmed this principle,254
Parliament alone.253
however, he did not articulate any substantive limit on eminent domain,
other than that it should be exercised cautiously.255
Because Blackstone accepted the legislature’s power to take property,256
interpreting his statement about the “great . . . regard of the law for private
property”257 is difficult. On one hand, Blackstone could have been
describing the limited takings power held by the Crown, rather than the
more expansive one held by Parliament.258 On the other, Blackstone’s
statement could also be read to proscribe all takings for public benefit
instead of public use.259 Like classical liberalism and republicanism,
English common law does not definitively answer the question of what
limitation public use provided early Americans.
B.

The Early American Experience

While philosophy and the English experience undoubtedly influenced the
founding generation, other uniquely American conditions also contributed
to the founding generation’s views on property rights. This section begins
by examining state antecedents to the federal Takings Clause, followed by a
detailed discussion of its drafting and ratification. It closes by exploring the
writings of Blackstone’s American counterpart, Chancellor James Kent.
1.

State Antecedents to the Takings Clause

Not every state constitution contained a clause equivalent to the Public
Use Clause of the Fifth Amendment, though the experience in some
colonies caused citizens to be particularly wary of property expropriations.
Accordingly, some early state constitutions did include additional
substantive protection for property rights.
The Pennsylvania and Virginia Constitutions were the first early
American constitutions to use the term “public use” in 1776.260 Later, the
and the Original Understanding of the So-Called “Takings” Clause, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 1245,
1259 (2002); William B. Stoebuck, A General Theory of Eminent Domain, 47 WASH. L.
REV. 553, 562–63 (1972).
252. Harrington, supra note 251, at 1259–60 (noting that, when necessary for defense, the
subject still owned the land while the Crown used it, whereas the Crown already held title to
the property in the other case).
253. See supra note 246 and accompanying text; see also Harrington, supra note 251, at
1260, 1264 (arguing the power of eminent domain resides in the legislature because takings
require consent of the owner, which must be achieved directly or through his legal
representatives).
254. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 145, at *135.
255. Id.; see also Goho, supra note 180, at 51.
256. See supra note 246 and accompanying text.
257. See supra note 249 and accompanying text.
258. See Breau, supra note 130, at 385.
259. See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 510 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
260. PA. CONST. of 1776, art. VIII, reprinted in 5 THE FEDERAL AND STATE
CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES,
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New Hampshire Constitution of 1784 paralleled Pennsylvania’s
While the first “public use” language did appear
language.261
constitutionally prior to Madison’s proposal for the Bill of Rights,262 the
historical record lacks documentary evidence explaining whether these
provisions actually originally limited the states’ power of eminent
domain.263 Importantly, three state or territory constitutions also had
provisions more explicitly linking the power of eminent domain and the
concept of public use: Vermont,264 Massachusetts,265 and the Northwest
Territory.266
Fear of legislative overreaching was likely an underlying reason for the
potentially more restrictive public use language in the constitutions of
Vermont, Massachusetts, and the Northwest Territory.267 The unique
historical experiences in these territories shed light on the language.
Because of competing claims to Vermont land by both New York and New
Hampshire, Vermont citizens were especially interested in the protection of
property rights.268 Since the New York legislature had actually tried to
TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES NOW OR HERETOFORE FORMING THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA 3081, 3083 (Francis Newton Thorpe ed., 1909) [hereinafter FEDERAL AND STATE
CONSTITUTIONS] (“[N]o part of a man’s property can be justly taken from him, or applied to
public uses, without his own consent, or that of his legal representatives.”) (emphasis added);
VA. CONST. of 1776, § 6, reprinted in 7 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra, 3812,
3813 (“[A]ll men . . . cannot be taxed or deprived of their property for public uses, without
their own consent, or that of their representatives so elected . . . .”) (emphasis added); see
also Stoebuck, supra note 251, at 591 (“The words ‘public use’ first appeared
constitutionally in 1776 in Pennsylvania and Virginia.”).
261. N.H. CONST. of 1784, pt. I, art. XII, reprinted in 4 FEDERAL AND STATE
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 260, at 2453, 2455 (“[N]o part of a man’s property shall be taken
from him, or applied to public uses, without his own consent, or that of the representative
body of the people.”) (emphasis added).
262. See infra note 281 and accompanying text (referencing a 1789 Madison speech
proposing various amendments).
263. Stoebuck, supra note 251, at 592 (“[T]he . . . evidence is not sufficient to establish
that the drafters consciously intended such limitation.”).
264. VT. CONST. of 1777, ch. 1, art. II, reprinted in 6 FEDERAL AND STATE
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 260, at 3737, 3740 (“That private property ought to be
subservient to public uses, when necessity requires it; nevertheless, whenever any particular
man’s property is taken for the use of the public, the owner ought to receive an equivalent in
money.”) (emphasis added). The Vermont Constitution of 1786 has identical language. VT.
CONST. of 1786, ch. 1, art. II (1787), reprinted in 6 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS,
supra note 260, at 3749, 3752. The people of Vermont only ratified the later constitution.
Stoebuck, supra note 251, at 592.
265. MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. I, art. X, reprinted in 3 FEDERAL AND STATE
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 260, at 1888, 1891 (“[N]o part of the property of any individual
can, with justice, be taken from him, or applied to the public uses, without his own consent,
or that of the representative body of the people. . . . [W]henever the public exigencies require
that the property of any individual should be appropriated to public uses, he shall receive a
reasonable compensation therefor.”) (emphasis added).
266. Northwest Ordinance of 1787, art. 2, reprinted in SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES, supra
note at 247, at 395 (“No man shall be deprived of his . . . property, but by the judgment of
his peers, or the law of the land, and should the public exigencies make it necessary, for the
common preservation, to take any person’s property, or to demand his particular services,
full compensation shall be made for the same.”) (emphasis added).
267. See Treanor, Note, supra note 229, at 702–04, 706–08.
268. Id. at 703–04.
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deprive Vermont residents of their land, the Vermont Constitution
manifested skepticism toward unchecked legislative power and contained
provisions especially protective of individual rights, particularly
property.269
In Massachusetts, citizens were similarly disillusioned with legislatures
because special interest groups dominated state politics.270 In particular,
citizens feared the legislature would not provide adequate protection for
property because of concern over the debtor-creditor laws and confiscation
of loyalist property.271
Although the public use language in the Vermont and Massachusetts
Constitutions loosely parallels language in the Fifth Amendment’s Takings
Clause,272 the Northwest Ordinance used more restrictive language,
allowing eminent domain only in cases where “public exigencies [made] it
necessary, for the common preservation.”273 This provision was likely
added because of Congressional fear that the territorial legislature would
rescind land grants.274
The presence of state constitutional public use provisions protecting
property against legislative interference can support the argument that early
Americans adopted a more liberal view of protecting individual rights from
government abrogation through establishing requirements for takings.275
Specifically, if public use originally provided a strict limitation on the
exercise of eminent domain, an individual’s private property would face
less risk of condemnation.
Still, when examining these early constitutional provisions protecting
property from legislative overreaching, one sees that property was heavily
regulated both before and after the Revolution.276 While regulation is a
269. See id. at 702–03. The property protections in Vermont were part of a broader
ideological shift in the state that specifically emphasized increased protection for individual
rights against government overreaching. Id. at 703–04. But see Harrington, supra note 251,
at 1277 (arguing that following the Revolution, Americans had widespread faith in
legislatures).
270. See Treanor, Note, supra note 229, at 706.
271. Id. at 706 & n.65.
272. Compare U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public
use, without just compensation”), with VT. CONST. of 1786, ch. 1, art. II (1787), reprinted in
6 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 260, at 3737 (“[W]henever any particular
man’s property is taken for the use of the public, the owner ought to receive an equivalent in
money.”), and MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. I, art. X, reprinted in 3 FEDERAL AND STATE
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 260, at 1888 (“[W]henever the public exigencies require that the
property of any individual should be appropriated to public uses, he shall receive a
reasonable compensation therefor.”).
273. Northwest Ordinance of 1787, art. 2, reprinted in SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES, supra
note at 247, at 395.
274. See Treanor, Note, supra note 229, at 707.
275. See, e.g., infra notes 343–44 and accompanying text (noting scholarship advocating
this theory).
276. See, e.g., John F. Hart, Colonial Land Use Law and Its Significance for Modern
Takings Doctrine, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1252, 1259–81 (1996) [hereinafter Hart, Colonial
Land Use Law] (listing land use regulations, including affirmative use requirements,
aesthetics and community planning, and regulations for fencing, mining, riparian land, and
wetlands); John F. Hart, Land Use Law in the Early Republic and the Original Meaning of
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substantively different power than takings, longstanding, extensive land use
regulation in the colonies counters the idea that Americans of the founding
generation believed in robust protection of individual property rights.277
Indeed, this evidence can support the argument that early Americans
adopted a more republican view of public use, allowing takings (and land
use regulation) simply because it benefited the populace at large.
2.

The Drafting and Ratification of the Takings Clause

There is little evidence of why the Takings Clause was included in the
Bill of Rights. No state ratifying convention proposed the Clause.278 There
are no records of debates in either House of Congress or any of the states
regarding its meaning.279 In the most specific instance of an early
commentator addressing the potential original meaning, St. George Tucker
opined in 1803 that the Takings Clause was likely included in the Bill of
Rights to protect against arbitrary military seizures, which early Americans
experienced at the hands of the British during the Revolution.280
The history of the Takings Clause’s drafting and ratification is brief.
Madison explained in a 1789 speech that his proposed amendments served a
twofold purpose, each embracing a distinct ideology: first, the Bill of
Rights would protect individuals by creating enforceable rules, and second,
it would act as a public statement of national aspirations.281 By protecting
individual rights through setting forth rules for an ideal society, the
amendments fulfilled both classically liberal and republican goals. From a
liberal perspective, the Bill of Rights would define and protect the

the Takings Clause, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 1099, 1116 (2000) [hereinafter Hart, Land Use Law
in the Early Republic] (listing similar categories of land use regulations).
277. Harrington, supra note 251, at 1298; Matthew P. Harrington, Regulatory Takings
and the Original Understanding of the Takings Clause, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2053, 2059
(2004) [hereinafter Harrington, Regulatory Takings]; John F. Hart, The Maryland Mill Act,
1669–1766: Economic Policy and the Confiscatory Redistribution of Private Property, 39
AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 1, 23 (1995).
278. See Amendments Proposed by the States (June 8, 1789), reprinted in 4
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA: LEGISLATIVE HISTORIES, AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION THROUGH FOREIGN
OFFICERS BILL [HR-116] 12–26 (Charlene Bangs Bickford & Helen E. Veit eds., 1986)
[hereinafter 4 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY] (listing amendments proposed by the conventions).
279. Treanor, supra note 6, at 791.
280. Id. at 791–92 (“[The Takings Clause] was probably intended to restrain the arbitrary
and oppressive mode of obtaining supplies for the army, and other public uses, by
impressment, as was too frequently practised during the revolutionary war.” (quoting 1
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE TO THE CONSTITUTION
AND LAWS, OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES; AND OF THE
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 305–06 (St. George Tucker ed., Lawbook Exchange Ltd.
1996) (1803))). St. George Tucker was the first legal scholar to propose an interpretation of
the Clause. Id. at 791.
281. See Treanor, supra note 6, at 837; see also James Madison, Amendments to the
Constitution (June 8, 1789), in 12 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 196, 204–05, 207
(Charles F. Hobson et al. eds., 1979) [hereinafter 12 MADISON PAPERS].
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individual against the state.282 At the same time, it would inform the
populace of American values.283
Madison’s initial proposed language for the Takings Clause read: “No
person shall be . . . obliged to relinquish his property, where it may be
necessary for public use, without a just compensation.”284 The select
committee assigned to examine the amendments altered Madison’s
language slightly to its current form.285 The House of Representatives
approved the amendment as written on August 24, 1789.286 When the
Senate considered the proposed amendment containing the Takings Clause
on September 4, 1789, it altered the language of the Double Jeopardy
Clause but agreed to the rest of the amendment without comment.287 After
resolving the differences between the House and Senate proposals affecting
other portions of the Bill of Rights, Congress sent the amendments to the
states for ratification on September 24, 1789.288
As the drafting and ratification history is sparse, the writings of James
Madison, the draftsman of the Takings Clause, are particularly important
sources when seeking to discover the original meaning of “public use.”289
When Madison discussed amending the Constitution, he explained that his
proposed amendments covered only topics Congress would consider
282. James Madison, Amendments to the Constitution (June 8, 1789), in 12 MADISON
PAPERS, supra note 281, at 207 (“[I]ndependent tribunals of justice will consider themselves
. . . the guardians of those rights; they will be an impenetrable bulwark against every
assumption of power in the legislative or executive . . . .”).
283. Id. at 204–05 (“[P]aper barriers . . . have a tendency to impress some degree of
respect for them, to establish the public opinion in their favor, and rouse the attention of the
whole community, it maybe one mean to controul the majority from those acts to which they
might be otherwise inclined.”). But see BERNSTEIN, supra note 206, at 57 (“Madison . . .
retained skepticism about the power of a written declaration of rights to protect liberty in the
face of a determined majority . . . .”).
284. James Madison, Amendments to the Constitution (June 8, 1789), in 12 MADISON
PAPERS, supra note 281, at 201. Madison originally intended for the amendments to be
inserted into the text of the Constitution itself, not appended as a separate document. Id. His
proposed Takings Clause was numbered fourth and was to be inserted in Article I, Section
Nine between Clauses Three and Four after what would become the Double Jeopardy
Clause, the Self-Incrimination Clause, and the Due Process Clause, respectively. Id.
285. H.R. COMM. REP. ¶ 8 (July 28, 1789), reprinted in 4 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra
note 278, at 29. The committee also renumbered the Takings Clause to the eighth proposal.
Id.
286. First Session (Aug. 24, 1789), reprinted in 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST
FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
JOURNAL 165, 166–67 (Linda Grant De Pauw et al. eds., 1977) [hereinafter 3 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY].
287. First Session (Sept. 4, 1789), reprinted in 1 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST
FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: SENATE LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL
153, 154 (Linda Grant De Pauw et al. eds., 1972).
288. First Session (Sept. 24, 1789), reprinted in 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note
286, at 227, 228–29. The amendments were renumbered after ratification in 1791 to reflect
the current order because the states approved only ten of the original twelve proposals. U.S.
CONST. amend. V; AMAR, supra note 64, at 8.
289. See Treanor, supra note 6, at 791. This section does not review Madison’s writings
in an effort to uncover his subjective intent in including the Takings Clause among his
proposals for the Bill of Rights. Rather it explores his writings to illustrate what Madison
and early Americans might have felt about substantive protection for private property.
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uncontroversial.290 This statement, combined with the lack of debate in the
House, Senate, or states on the inclusion of the Takings Clause, lends
credence to the argument that the Takings Clause might simply have served
as an uncontroversial statement of the status quo on eminent domain, which
seemed to contemplate some, but not too much, protection for private
property.291
Along that vein, Madison’s Federalist No. 10 argued even before the
Constitution’s ratification that a strong federal republic was the best means
of controlling factions and competing interests.292 In particular, Madison
pointed out that those with property and those without had distinctly
different concerns.293 Government inevitably created winners and losers,
and a federal system would most effectively counteract a group’s ability to
seize and maintain control of the government, a task that would be easier to
accomplish at a more localized level.294 Since the political process would
provide adequate structural protection for property interests, Federalist No.
10 suggested that Madison, as well as other early Americans, might not
have seen additional substantive protections for property as necessary.295
Nonetheless, examining other Madison writings shows that he thought
physical property—particularly land and slaves—might need substantive
protection from the political process.296 Indeed, the inevitable population
increase could potentially make landowners a minority, subject to the
whims of non-landowners who might pass redistributive legislation.297 In
this way, some early Americans might also have thought that physical
property interests needed additional protection beyond what the political
process already provided.298
Finally, Madison’s writings after the ratification of the Bill of Rights
continued to draw a distinction between the types of property requiring
additional protection. In particular, his essay Property responded to
Alexander Hamilton’s proposed economic programs.299 In the tract,
Madison conceived of property as more than a mere physical object,
describing it as including several intangibles such as opinions, safety, and

290. Letter from James Madison to Edmund Randolph (June 15, 1789), in 12 MADISON
PAPERS, supra note 281, at 219 (“[The proposed amendments are] limited to points which
are important in the eyes of many and can be objectionable in the eyes of none.”); Letter
from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (June 30, 1789), in 12 MADISON PAPERS, supra
note 281, at 272 (“Inclosed is a copy of sundry amendments to the Constitution . . . . Every
thing of a controvertible nature that might endanger the concurrence of two-thirds of each
House and three-fourths of the States was studiously avoided.”).
291. See infra note 315 and accompanying text.
292. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 57–61 (James Madison) (Lawbook Exch. & Martino
Publishing 2001).
293. Id. at 55.
294. Id. at 60–61.
295. Treanor, supra note 6, at 842–43.
296. Id. at 847.
297. Id. at 849.
298. Id. at 851; see also Treanor, Note, supra note 229, at 708 (“[The Takings Clause]
was to apply . . . only to physical takings.”).
299. Treanor, supra note 6, at 838.
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free choice.300 Madison directly invoked the language of the Takings
Clause to distinguish between physical and other types of takings,301
criticizing the spirit of Hamilton’s economic program, a non-physical
taking, as inconsistent with the goals of the Takings Clause.302 This
statement demonstrates Madison, as well as other early Americans, might
have contemplated a more robust role for the Takings Clause in protecting
individuals.
Examining the drafting and ratification history of the Takings Clause
provides few answers as to its original meaning. Further, ascertaining a
cohesive Madisonian theory on property proves equally elusive. Madison’s
stated goals in proposing the Bill of Rights encapsulated two different
philosophical ideals: classical liberalism and classical republicanism.
Further, Madison suggested in some contemporary writings that property
did not need additional substantive protection and in others that physical
property, especially land, just might. In the years after the Bill of Rights,
Madison’s Property envisioned an even more liberal view of the Takings
Clause as protective, at least in spirit, of individual rights.
3.

American Common Law

American eminent domain doctrine did not stray far from traditional
Like Blackstone’s treatise, Chancellor Kent’s
English law.303
Commentaries on American Law discussed early American views on
private property.304 Initially published in four volumes between 1826 and
1830,305 Kent’s Commentaries played an integral role in establishing
American common law.306
In describing private property, Kent echoed Blackstone and the English
tradition when noting, “[N]o man [can] be deprived of his property without
his consent . . . .”307 As for eminent domain, Kent emphasized that the
power “gives to the legislature the control of private property for public
uses, and for public uses only.”308
Kent went on to explain that the legislature had the power to determine
when “public uses require[d] the assumption of private property,”309
explaining that a taking would be unconstitutional if it were “for a purpose
300. James Madison, Property, NAT’L GAZETTE, Mar. 27, 1792, reprinted in 14 MADISON
PAPERS, supra note 126, at 266.
301. Id. at 267–68 (“If there be a government then which prides itself in maintaining the
inviolability of property; which provides that none shall be taken directly even for public use
without indemnification to the owner, and yet directly violates the property which
individuals have in their opinions, their religion, their persons, and their faculties . . . such a
government is not a pattern for the United States.”).
302. Treanor, supra note 6, at 839.
303. Harrington, supra note 251, at 1270; see also supra Part IV.A.3.
304. 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW *317–54 (1873).
305. Carl F. Stychin, The Commentaries of Chancellor James Kent and the Development
of an American Common Law, 37 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 440, 443 (1993).
306. Id. at 462.
307. 2 KENT, supra note 304, at *323.
308. Id. at *339 (emphasis added).
309. Id. at *340.

300

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79

not of a public nature.”310 As Kent used both “public uses” and “purpose . .
. of a public nature” when describing legislative limitations on eminent
domain, it is unclear if he contemplated literal use by the public as an
express limitation. As examples of instances when a taking would be
unconstitutional, he discussed taking property from A to give to B or under
the pretext of public use, neither of which clarifies whether Kent thought
property could legally be taken for public purposes.311
Despite this language seeming to limit the takings power, Kent also noted
that, “[T]here are many cases in which the rights of property must be made
subservient to the public welfare.”312 He described a situation where roads
could be cut through cultivated land without the owner’s consent because
“the interest of the public is deemed paramount to that of any private
individual.”313 Further, when describing a check on the legislative power
of eminent domain, Kent cited the compensation principle, rather than
public use limitations.314 Accordingly, Kent’s documentation of American
common law in the years following the founding yields no definitive
answers on whether early Americans considered public use to be a
limitation on the power of eminent domain.
C.

Broad Interpretations of the History of Public Use

Scholars advocating a broad interpretation of the original meaning of
public use focus more on the early American experience than on legal and
philosophical influences from Britain. Through examining early state
constitutions and the drafting and ratification history of the Takings Clause,
they argue nothing in the record indicates that the original meaning required
literal use. Specifically, they agree that, although takings required some
kind of public benefit, early Americans never insisted on actual possession
or use of the appropriated property by members of the public.315
The constitutions of Massachusetts, Vermont, and the Northwest
Territory all contained public use language prior to the Fifth
Amendment.316
To distinguish the early state antecedents, one
commentator notes the language of the state provisions differs from the
federal Takings Clause by seemingly requiring, in addition to the public
use, a condition precedent to the exercise of the takings power.317
Specifically, the Vermont constitution speaks of “necessity” while
Massachusetts and the Northwest Territory require “public exigencies.”318

310. Id.
311. Id.
312. Id. at *338.
313. Id. at *339.
314. Id.
315. Buckner F. Melton, Jr., Eminent Domain, “Public Use,” and the Conundrum of
Original Intent, 36 NAT. RESOURCES J. 59, 80 (1996).
316. See supra notes 264–66 and accompanying text.
317. Breau, supra note 130, at 381–82.
318. See supra notes 264–66.
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The lack of similar language in the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause might
suggest that it is less restrictive than the state counterparts.319
Along these lines, Professor Gordon Wood recounts how the new state
governments aggressively asserted themselves post-Revolution, especially
with respect to furthering economic growth. For instance, he uses the
example of the City of New York, explaining that after acquiring the power
of eminent domain, it no longer had to concern itself with “whose property
is benefited . . . or is not benefited.”320 Professor Wood concludes that in
the years following independence, “The power of the state to take private
property was now viewed as virtually unlimited—as long as the property
was taken for exclusively public purposes.”321
As for the Takings Clause itself, scholars interpreting it broadly argue
that the complete lack of debate about it shows that early Americans were
nonchalant about its limitations. In particular, neither the colonial nor
revolutionary experiences had created any pressing concerns among
Americans regarding eminent domain.322 As one commentator noted,
“[W]hile the British were scoundrels in a thousand ways, they never abused
eminent domain. They surely would have been accused of it if they
had.”323
In terms of seeking substantive Constitutional protection for property,
these scholars point to evidence showing that early Americans were more
worried about regulations affecting property value, than with actual
physical appropriations. For example, Professor Matthew Harrington
asserts that federalists were mainly concerned with the potential to devalue
property through either debtor relief legislation or printing of paper
currency.324 On the other hand, anti-federalists wanted to limit the federal
government’s taxation power.325 This absence of demand for protection
from eminent domain showed a lack of concern on the part of early
Americans that physical property rights would be abrogated.326
Furthermore, these scholars argue that the term “public use” is used
descriptively, not as a limiting principle, in the text of the Takings
Clause.327 Given Madison’s eloquence, he could have phrased the Takings
Clause explicitly to make public use an express limitation, if that were its
original meaning.328 Indeed, after the ratification of the Bill of Rights,
319. Breau, supra note 130, at 382.
320. WOOD, RADICALISM, supra note 224, at 188 (quotation marks omitted).
321. Id.; see also Harrington, supra note 251, at 1252–53.
322. Harrington, Regulatory Takings, supra note 277, at 2079.
323. Stoebuck, supra note 251, at 594; see also Errol E. Meidinger, The “Public Uses” of
Eminent Domain: History and Policy, 11 ENVTL. L. 1, 17 (1980) (“Eminent domain was one
prerogative the British had not been charged with abusing in the New World.”).
324. Harrington, supra note 251, at 1288.
325. Id. at 1289.
326. Treanor, supra note 6, at 835; see also Harrington, Regulatory Takings, supra note
277, at 2067–68 (noting that over two hundred amendments were proposed by state ratifying
committees, yet none had to do with the expropriation or direct regulation of land).
327. Stoebuck, supra note 251, at 591.
328. 1 JOHN LEWIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN IN THE UNITED STATES,
at ii (1888) (“The language of the [Takings Clause] does not indicate [that public use was
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Madison commented in an essay that the Fifth Amendment limited the
government from taking property “directly even for public use,”329 thereby
implying that government had the power to take property for reasons
beyond public use.330
As the Takings Clause moved through the drafting and ratification
process, no debate occurred in either the House or the Senate on its
guarantees.331 The changes made to the text were purely stylistic, not
substantive.332 Scholars assert this is especially compelling evidence
because members of both Houses of Congress made alterations to many of
Madison’s other proposals.333 Silence here indicates that the Takings
Clause was likely a confirmation of the status quo, wherein actual use by
the public did not limit the power of eminent domain.334 Further, they
argue, the lack of debate also lends credence to the idea that the founding
generation thought the Takings Clause, as written, adequately protected
private property.335
D.

Narrow Interpretations of the History of Public Use

Scholars who assert that the Public Use Clause originally limited the
state’s power of eminent domain also focus on evidence from the historical
record. Through examining early state constitutions and founding era
political philosophy, they insist that literal use is the only reading of the
Public Use Clause that gives effect to all the words in the text. To construe
the words broadly would ignore not only Marbury v. Madison’s warning
that all words of the Constitution should be considered336 but also the ideals
of classical liberalism, a significant political philosophy at the time of the
founding.
In response to those who believe the Fifth Amendment Public Use Clause
contains less restrictive limitations than early state constitutions, scholars
advocating a narrow approach argue that constitutional public use language
originally intended to operate as a limitation]. . . . If the intent had been to make the words,
public use, a limitation, the natural form of expression would have been: ‘Private property
shall not be taken except for public use, nor without just compensation.’”). Cf. Hart, Land
Use Law in the Early Republic, supra note 276, at 1101 (noting that Madison would have
included land use regulation in the Takings Clause if he had intended the principle of just
compensation to apply to regulatory takings).
329. James Madison, Property, NAT’L GAZETTE, Mar. 27, 1792, reprinted in 14 MADISON
PAPERS, supra note 126, at 267.
330. Goho, supra note 180, at 63 (noting that the word “even” suggests a difference
between takings that are for a public use and those that are not).
331. See supra notes 286–88 and accompanying text.
332. Harrington, supra note 251, at 1286; Harrington, Regulatory Takings, supra note
277, at 2078; William Michael Treanor, Take-ings, 45 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 633, 641 (2008)
(arguing changes were likely intended to bring the Takings Clause in line with its precursors
that almost uniformly used the word “take” or a variant); see also supra notes 284–85 and
accompanying text (showing Madison’s initial proposal for the Takings Clause).
333. Harrington, supra note 251, at 1294.
334. Hart, Land Use Law in the Early Republic, supra note 276, at 1133; Treanor, supra
note 6, at 782; see also infra notes 414–16 and accompanying text.
335. Harrington, supra note 251, at 1287; Melton, Jr., supra note 315, at 80.
336. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
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is always restrictive, rather than descriptive.337 These scholars insist the
presence of such language cannot support an interpretation that effectively
ignores the words of the text by allowing takings for public benefit.338 The
public use language of state constitutions, they argue, must originally have
functioned as a limit on the taking of property, otherwise the phrase would
be surplusage.339
In addition to the public use language, the Vermont, Massachusetts, and
Northwest Territory constitutions all contained provisions suggesting that
“necessity” or “public exigency” represented conditions precedent to the
exercise of the takings power.340 Even if a state could point to these types
of exigent circumstances necessitating a taking, these scholars assert that
public use also imposed an additional substantive limit.341 This argument
suggests that early Americans thought the takings power should be used
sparingly and only in critical circumstances, rather than employed broadly
to support social and economic goals.
In support of a narrow interpretation, scholars also analyze the influence
of political philosophy, particularly classical liberalism, on the founding
generation. Under classical liberal ideology, the state could never
legitimately abrogate individual rights, including the right to property.342
Generally, scholars who assert public use is an explicit and literal limitation
on the takings power consider John Locke and liberal thinkers, who viewed
government as an entity with limited powers, to be the primary inspiration
for early Americans.343 These scholars argue that the founding generation
agreed with the Lockean idea that government must abide by the same
moral rules as those whom it governs.344
337. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 14, at 163 (“The prohibition on taking for public use is
categorical, not squishy.”); Note, The Public Use Limitation on Eminent Domain: An
Advance Requiem, 58 YALE L.J. 599, 600 (1949) (explaining that “use by the public” was a
limitation of natural law that did not even need to be explicitly stated).
338. Timothy Sandefur, A Natural Rights Perspective on Eminent Domain in California:
A Rationale for Meaningful Judicial Scrutiny of “Public Use”, 32 SW. U. L. REV. 569, 588
n.95 (2003) (arguing that those who interpret the Public Use Clause broadly violate the
fundamental notion that the Constitution must be read to give effect to all of its words).
339. Claeys, supra note 182, at 897.
340. See supra notes 317–18 and accompanying text.
341. Claeys, supra note 182, at 897; Sandefur, supra note 338, at 574–75. Procedurally,
Sandefur proposes that the legislature’s job was to evaluate the necessity of the taking,
subject to judicial review of whether the taking was for public use. Sandefur, supra note 338,
at 575.
342. Sandefur, supra note 16, at 3; Sandefur, supra note 338, at 583; see also Claeys,
supra note 182, at 894 (noting Locke warned that eminent domain could not exist without
the consent of the governed).
343. EPSTEIN, supra note 225, at 15–16 (“The Lockean system was dominant at the time
when the Constitution was adopted.”); see also Sandefur, supra note 338, at 579–80.
344. Sandefur, supra note 16, at 3. Sandefur presents the debate between Justices Chase
and James Iredell in Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798), as an example. See
Sandefur, supra, at 9–12. Justice Chase represented the Lockean perspective when he stated,
“An ACT of the Legislature (for I cannot call it a law) contrary to the great first principles of
the social compact, cannot be considered a rightful exercise of legislative authority.” Calder,
3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 388. Justice Chase offered the example of “a law that takes property from
A. and gives it to B” as the quintessential example of such an invalid exercise of authority.

304

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79

Finally, these scholars argue that the founders, particularly Madison,
were especially concerned with factions, or the ability of a majority to
make, enforce, and interpret the law.345 A taking can seem particularly
arbitrary, especially if the appropriation singles out an individual
landowner. To protect minorities from potential majority abuse of the
eminent domain power, a public use limitation was therefore necessary,
scholars argue, to protect citizens against this kind of overreaching.346 If
the public use limitation were construed broadly instead, it would eliminate
an important check contained in the Constitution: to protect the minority
against the whims of the politically powerful.347
E.

Comparing the Broad and Narrow Interpretations

Very different ideologies influenced early Americans at the time of the
nation’s founding.
Classical liberalism and classical republicanism
espoused opposite concepts of the ideal relationship between the individual
and the state.348 By elucidating individual liberties, the Bill of Rights
shows the influence of classical liberalism on the framers.349 At the same
time, the Takings Clause in particular embodies classical republicanism’s
focus on the common good by requiring individual property owners to
sacrifice personal property for the benefit of society at large.350
When scholars emphasize the founding generation’s liberal leanings, the
outcome naturally leads to a narrow interpretation of public use to protect
individual rights of private property.351 Nonetheless, it is impossible to
characterize the founding generation as entirely liberal or entirely
republican,352 and thus the tenants of neither philosophy provide
authoritative evidence regarding the original meaning of eminent domain
limitations.
Early treatises on English and American common law also do not draw a
coherent line between a literal interpretation of public use and a broader
interpretation that includes public benefit.353 For example, Blackstone
acknowledged the legislative ability to take property—without articulating
a substantive limit—while simultaneously extolling that the law’s great
regard for private property would not allow infringements, even for the

Id. Justice Iredell responded by questioning the validity of the argument that “a legislative
act against natural justice must, in itself, be void.” Id. at 398 (Iredell, J., concurring).
345. Sandefur, supra note 338, at 587; see also supra notes 292–94 and accompanying
text.
346. Sandefur, supra note 338, at 587–88.
347. Id. at 588–89 & n.95.
348. Compare Part IV.A.1, with Part IV.A.2.
349. See supra notes 208–09 and accompanying text.
350. See supra note 240 and accompanying text.
351. See supra notes 343–44 and accompanying text.
352. See supra notes 206–07 and accompanying text
353. See supra notes 246–59, 307–14 and accompanying text.

2010]

RECONCILING ORIGINALISM

305

common good.354 Likewise, Chancellor Kent described limitations on the
power of eminent domain in terms of both use and purpose.355
Several state constitutions drafted prior to the Bill of Rights included
public use language similar to the federal Takings Clause. Unlike the
federal Takings Clause, however, the Vermont, Massachusetts, and the
Northwest Territory constitutions also included language that required
necessity or exigent circumstances as a prerequisite to use of the eminent
domain power.356 While scholars disagree on whether this language makes
it more or less certain that public use was an additional, stringent
limitation,357 it is clear that several of the early state constitutions reflected
local circumstances that were not present at a national level.358 At a
national level, the British had not abused the power of eminent domain visà-vis the colonies, whereas citizens in states like Vermont had actually been
subject to attempts to appropriate land by the New York legislature.359
Like political philosophy and common law practices at the founding, the
early state constitutions do not provide a clear answer as to the original
meaning of the federal Public Use Clause.
Additionally, the sparse history of the Takings Clause’s drafting and
ratification does not aid in the search for its original meaning. Some
interpret the lack of evidence as confirmation that the Takings Clause did
not add any additional substantive limitations to the state’s ability to
exercise the power of eminent domain.360 These scholars argue that public
use was synonymous with public benefit in early America.361 In contrast,
scholars who interpret the Clause narrowly insist that reading it this way
blatantly disregards the text of the Amendment.362
In the case of public use, the text, structure, and history of the Takings
Clause provide no authoritative meaning on what kind of limitations it
places on the power of eminent domain. With these sources yielding
inconsistent conclusions on original meaning, originalists look to see if
early judicial interpretations present a coherent idea of how early
Americans viewed public use limitations.
V. EARLY JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS OF PUBLIC USE
Part V examines judicial interpretations of the Mill Acts, a group of
statutes legalizing eminent domain by private actors for the purpose of

354. See supra notes 249, 253–55 and accompanying text.
355. See supra notes 309–10 and accompanying text.
356. See supra notes 264–66 and accompanying text.
357. See supra notes 317–19, 340–41 and accompanying text.
358. See supra notes 267–74 and accompanying text.
359. See supra notes 268–69, 322–23 and accompanying text.
360. See supra notes 331–35 and accompanying text.
361. See Melton, Jr., supra note 315, at 85 (“[T]he doctrine . . . is consistent with the
original American concept, which appeared in colonial, revolutionary, and early national
days, that while ‘public use’ was necessary, ‘public use’ actually meant public benefit—of
almost any conceivable kind.”).
362. See supra notes 337–39 and accompanying text.
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public economic benefit.363 These cases provide a close analogy to the
question of public use in Kelo.364 Despite most decisions occurring several
decades after the founding,365 scholars and jurists in search of the original
meaning of the Public Use Clause frequently cite precedent from the Mill
Act cases, even decisions from the late nineteenth century, to support either
a broad366 or a narrow367 interpretation of public use.368 Accordingly, the
temporal relevance of the decisions is a criticism applying equally to all
scholars relying on Mill Act case law.
Because the Supreme Court held in the early nineteenth century that the
Takings Clause applied only to expropriations by the federal government,
not the states, property protections remained subject to state law during that
time.369 However, after the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution following the Civil War, the Court gradually began applying
the protections in the Bill of Rights to the states, eventually incorporating
the Takings Clause in 1897.370 Since the first adjudications of federal
takings did not occur until 1875,371 state law and eminent domain practice
at the time of the drafting and ratification of the Takings Clause are the
relevant decisions to review when interpreting its original meaning.372
A.

The Mill Acts

The Mill Acts collectively refer to a group of similar statutes, enacted in
several colonies and states,373 that essentially transferred the power of
363. See infra Part V.A.
364. While courts in the nineteenth century were faced with public use challenges by a
variety of regulated industries, railroads or utilities for example, the Mill Acts closely
parallel the modern context as the takings there were necessary for private economic growth.
MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW: 1780–1860, at 34 (1977).
365. See infra Part V.A.1–2; see also Ely Jr., supra note 15, at 54 (“The Supreme Court
had little occasion to address the ‘public use’ requirement until the late nineteenth century.”).
The Mill Act decisions are in some cases quite far temporally removed from 1780s–1790s
and traditionally would not be particularly probative of original meaning. See supra notes
36–38 and accompanying text. Nevertheless, these decisions provide scholars the
opportunity to examine how courts historically approached the issue of public use when it
intersected with economic benefit, without addressing common carrier regulations.
Interpretations of public use—both broad and narrow—relating to other private entities
subject to regulations, like railroads, are beyond the scope of this Note.
366. This section will refer to a broad interpretation of the Mill Acts as instances in which
courts used a public benefit standard to uphold the constitutionality of the statute at issue.
367. This section will refer to a narrow interpretation of the Mill Acts as instances in
which courts required actual use by the public to uphold the constitutionality of the statute at
issue.
368. See infra Part V.B–D.
369. See Barron v. City of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 247 (1833).
370. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 238–41
(1897).
371. Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367, 371–72 (1875).
372. Treanor, supra note 6, at 859–63 (arguing that early state law and practice is relevant
for evaluating original understanding). But see infra note 448 and accompanying text
(justifying a departure from the original meaning by examining instead the postincorporation time period).
373. See Head v. Amoskeag Mfg. Co., 113 U.S. 9, 17–18 (1885) (listing twenty-nine
states, as of 1885, that had Mill Acts or had previously enacted such statutes). Delaware,
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eminent domain to private actors—generally riparian landowners—to
facilitate the building of water-powered mills.374 The statutes typically
either authorized the mill owner to condemn neighboring land,
compensating the landowner for title to the property, or allowed the mill
owner to pay damages to the landowner for flooding resulting from
damming the river.375
Benefit to the public from these takings by private actors accrued
indirectly by enabling the development of local industry, instead of directly
by allowing literal public use of the land.376 In the case of some flour mills,
though, the public benefited more directly because locals sometimes had a
right granted by statute to use the facility to grind their grain.377 In general,
as this section details, courts in the early nineteenth century allowed the
takings for reasons of providing economic benefit, while later courts
required the public to make actual use of the taken land.378
1.

Decisions Upholding Takings Under the Mill Acts

Around the turn of the nineteenth century, landowners faced with losing
property as a result of condemnations under the Mill Acts began to
challenge the statutes, resulting in some courts upholding the laws by
articulating a broad concept of public use.379 In many ways, these opinions
Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Rhode Island, and Virginia
enacted statutes authorizing such takings in the seventeenth or eighteenth centuries, prior to
the drafting and ratification of the Bill of Rights. Id. Delaware later repealed its
condemnation provision in 1773. See John F. Hart, Property Rights, Costs, and Welfare:
Delaware Water Mill Legislation, 1719–1859, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 455, 461 (1998) (arguing
that the reason for the repeal seems to have been a desire to protect existing mills from
crowding, rather than a rejection of the condemnation power). Similarly, Maryland repealed
its condemnation provisions in 1766. See Hart, supra note 277, at 21–22 (positing that the
repeal did not reflect a commitment to preserve private property as a similar condemnation
procedure for ironworks facilities, rather than flour mills, remained intact).
374. Hart, Land Use Law in the Early Republic, supra note 276, at 1116. These statutes
took a variety of forms in each state, and the differences between them are beyond the scope
of this Note.
375. Id.
376. See Hart, Colonial Land Use Law, supra note 276, at 1267; Hart, Land Use Law in
the Early Republic, supra note 276, at 1117 & n.134.
377. Hart, Land Use Law in the Early Republic, supra note 276, at 1117 & n.134; see also
1 LEWIS 1888, supra note 328, at 246 & n.3 (noting Alabama, Delaware, Georgia, Kentucky,
and North Carolina statutes explicitly required the mills to grind the public’s flour); infra
note 388 (listing states without public access statutory requirements).
378. Compare infra Part V.A.1 (discussing cases that interpreted public use broadly from
1814–1885), with infra Part V.A.2 (discussing cases that interpreted public use narrowly
from 1832–1903).
379. See, e.g., Olmstead v. Camp, 33 Conn. 532, 546 (1866) (interpreting “public use” as
“appropriat[ion] of private property by the state . . . for purposes of great advantage to the
community”); Boston & Roxbury Mill Corp. v. Newman, 29 Mass. (12 Pick.) 467, 481
(1832) (holding that the Mill Act related to public exigencies and thus satisfied the
Massachusetts Public Use Clause, even though the public had no legal right to use the mill);
Great Falls Mfg. Co. v. Fernald, 47 N.H. 444, 452 (1867) (noting that public use does not
require unrestricted access to the entire community); Scudder v. Trenton Delaware Falls Co.,
1 N.J. Eq. 694, 729 (1832) (refusing to declare a statute authorizing condemnation by private
manufacturing mills unconstitutional on public use grounds because “[t]he ever varying
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can be seen as the forerunners to later Supreme Court jurisprudence
interpreting the Public Use Clause to require only a valid public purpose,
generally determined by the legislature.380
By allowing takings for public benefit, courts focused on the underlying
purpose of appropriating the land, rather than scrutinizing the actual
intended use of the property.381 In Stowell v. Flagg,382 for example, an
1814 court noted that since mills were of particular importance to early
public development, lands damaged by the flooding necessary to harness
water power satisfied the public use requirement.383 Notably, the court’s
decision did not focus on how the flooded land would further private
industry.384
The Supreme Court addressed the Mill Acts near the end of the
nineteenth century.385 The case concerned an action for damages under
New Hampshire’s statute, where the individual landowner challenged the
Act as an unconstitutional taking of his property.386 The Court upheld the
statute’s constitutionality, noting that it had not deprived the plaintiff of his
property without due process because it was a valid exercise of legislative
judgment.387 In particular, the Court stated that the validity of eminent
domain under the Mill Acts had long been upheld as satisfying the public
use requirement since harnessing water power for manufacturing purposes
benefited the public.388
Finally, in a case outside of the traditional water-powered mill context,
the Nevada Supreme Court upheld takings used to support the state’s
burgeoning mining industry.389 In doing so, the Seawell court considered
the necessity of eminent domain and whether the appropriation would

condition of society is constantly presenting new objects of public importance and utility” so
what constitutes public use may vary according to time and location).
380. See supra Part II.A.
381. Philip Nichols, Jr., The Meaning of Public Use in the Law of Eminent Domain, 20
B.U. L. REV. 615, 633 (1940).
382. 11 Mass. (11 Tyng) 364 (1814).
383. Id. at 366 n.a.
384. Id. at 366–68. The court did, however, question the motives of the legislature in
providing strong protection for private mill owners. Id. at 366 n.a. It is unclear in the
opinion if the Massachusetts statute allowed the public to use the mill, but it is likely that it
did. See HORWITZ, supra note 364, at 49 (“[The Stowell court] was merely questioning the
prudence of the legislative judgment, while never doubting that mills were public in terms of
whom they served.”).
385. Head v. Amoskeag Mfg. Co., 113 U.S. 9 (1885).
386. Id. at 10, 12. The plaintiff based his takings claim on the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses, not the Fifth Amendment, presumably because
the Fifth Amendment had yet to be incorporated and valid against the states. Id. at 12; see
also supra note 370 and accompanying text (noting the Court did not incorporate the
Takings Clause against the states until 1897).
387. Head, 113 U.S. at 26.
388. Id. at 19. While the New Hampshire statute required the mill be open for public use,
id. at 10 n.*, the Court noted that, “[T]he statutes of many states are not so limited.” Id. at 19
(naming specifically Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Kentucky as well as many
New England and western states for not explicitly requiring public use in Mill Act statutes).
389. Dayton Gold & Silver Mining Co. v. Seawell, 11 Nev. 394, 398–99 (1876).
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contribute to the public benefit.390 The court defended using a broad
interpretation of public use, arguing that a narrow requirement could lead to
perverse results.391 Indeed, the Seawell court argued that the broad
interpretation contained more limiting principles than a test focusing
literally on public use.392
The court closed its opinion by referencing the founding generation,
declaring that courts would be making an assumption if they presumed the
original meaning of public use required actual public use of the condemned
land.393 In reaching this conclusion, the court surveyed case law to show
that previous judicial decisions had also eschewed a literal interpretation of
public use.394 The Seawell court’s statements about original meaning show
that even courts temporally closer to the founding than the Kelo Court
considered determining the original meaning of the Public Use Clause to be
a speculative exercise.
When courts faced with challenges to the Mill Acts interpreted the public
use language broadly, they generally emphasized the benefit to the public
from allowing the takings, rather than focusing on the involvement of
private actors in the appropriations. Instead of engaging in textual or
historical analysis, these courts largely relied on precedent to hold that the
public benefit from the exercise of eminent domain satisfied public use
restrictions.395
2.

Decisions Striking Down Takings Under the Mill Acts

When courts interpreted the Mill Acts narrowly, the opinions generally
emphasized the intended use of the taken land, instead of focusing on the
purpose of the taking.396 These narrow interpretations emerged after the
broad interpretations397 and advocated reading public use literally to limit
the takings power.398 In particular, an early interpretation of public use in
1837 questioned whether a broad interpretation provided any limitation on
takings at all: “When we depart from the natural import of the term ‘public
390. Id. at 411. Echoing later jurisprudence, the court referred to assemblage problems as
a primary reason compelling the use of eminent domain. Id.; see also supra notes 78, 84 and
accompanying text (discussing assemblage problems in Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26
(1954)).
391. Seawell, 11 Nev. at 410–11 (“If public occupation and enjoyment . . . furnishes the
only and true test for the right of eminent domain, then the legislature would certainly have
the constitutional authority to condemn the lands of any private citizens for the purpose of
building hotels and theaters. . . . [T]his view, if literally carried out to the utmost extent,
would lead to very absurd results, if it did not entirely destroy the security of the private
rights of individuals.”).
392. Id.
393. Id. at 408 (“I think it would be an unwarranted assumption upon our part to declare
that the framers of the constitution did not intend to give to the term ‘public use’ the
meaning of public utility, benefit and advantage.”).
394. Id. at 400–08.
395. See supra notes 388, 394 and accompanying text.
396. Nichols, Jr., supra note 381, at 626–27.
397. See supra note 378 and accompanying text.
398. In contrast, cases advocating a broad interpretation questioned whether literal use
provided such a limitation. See supra note 391 and accompanying text.

310

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79

use,’ and substitute . . . public utility, public interest, common benefit,
general advantage or convenience, or . . . public improvement, is there any
limitation which can be set to the . . . appropriation of private property?”399
Some courts simply invalidated the takings made pursuant to the Mill
Acts, instead of finding the statutes unconstitutional. For example, in
Harding v. Goodlett,400 plaintiffs sought to condemn land for mills
producing flour, lumber, and paper.401 The court held that building the
flour mill was simply pretext for the use of the condemnation power
because the other mills would be purely private operations.402 In a different
example from Vermont, a mill owner petitioned the court to increase his
ability to flood a neighbor’s property.403 The court held that the taking was
not for public use because the statute did not require the mill owner to
provide service to the public at his facility.404 Accordingly, the taking was
a purely private transfer, not a condemnation for use by the public.405
Courts also went beyond invalidating takings to hold some Mill Acts
unconstitutional.406 For example, the Supreme Court of Michigan declared
a statute encouraging the building of “water power manufactories”
unconstitutional.407 The court noted that the statute “should require the use
to be public in fact . . . it should contain provisions entitling the public to
accommodations.”408 Similarly, the Supreme Court of Illinois declared a
statute authorizing condemnations for the benefit of “any public grist mill,
saw mill or other public mill” unconstitutional.409 Specifically, the court
noted the statute authorized the taking of private property for uses other
than public ones.410 In particular, the court defined public use as
“something more than a mere benefit to the public,” such as the right “to
use or enjoy the property, not as a mere favor or by permission of the
owner, but by right.”411

399. Bloodgood v. Mohawk & Hudson R.R. Co., 18 Wend. 9, 60–62 (N.Y. 1837) (Tracy,
Sen., concurring). In support of his opinion, Senator Tracy cited case law in addition to
historical authorities, such as European civil law philosophers, Blackstone, and Kent. Id. at
56–61, 75–76.
400. 11 Tenn. (3 Yer.) 40 (1832).
401. Id. at 41.
402. Id. at 53–54. The court noted, however, that the taking would be valid for the flour
mill. Id. at 52 (“The grist-mill is a public mill.”).
403. Tyler v. Beacher, 44 Vt. 648, 649 (1871).
404. Id. at 652–53.
405. Id. at 653.
406. See, e.g., Sadler v. Langham, 34 Ala. 311, 333–34 (1859) (invalidating a statute
authorizing condemnations because the statute covered all mills, not exclusively public flour
mills); Loughbridge v. Harris, 42 Ga. 500, 505 (1871) (invalidating a statute on the grounds
that it allowed private actors to exercise eminent domain and because mills were not an
appropriate public use).
407. Ryerson v. Brown, 35 Mich. 333, 334, 342 (1877).
408. Id. at 338.
409. Gaylord v. Sanitary Dist. of Chicago, 68 N.E. 522, 523–24 (Ill. 1903) (quoting the
Illinois Mill Act statute).
410. Id. at 526. The court noted, however, that the statute would be valid for flour mills.
Id.
411. Id. at 524.
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Broad Interpretations of the Mill Act Cases

Scholars frequently rely on the Mill Act cases to show how early courts
interpreted public use requirements, especially with respect to statutes that
promoted economic growth via the takings power. Scholarship advocating
a broad interpretation of public use argues that courts did not narrow the
concept until the mid-nineteenth century.412 At the turn of the century—the
relevant time period, scholars claim, for an inquiry into original meaning—
statutes such as the Mill Acts were “common, rarely contested, and
universally upheld.”413 While public use was necessary to the exercise of
the power of eminent domain, public use and public benefit were
synonymous at the time of the founding.414
While twenty-nine states had Mill Act statutes in the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries, over half of the colonies also had these statutes prior
to the drafting and ratification of the Bill of Rights.415 Such widespread
approval of statutes granting private actors the power of eminent domain at
the time of the founding lends credence to the argument that the early
Americans entertained a broad definition of “public use” that included
encouraging public economic benefit.416 A treatise even noted that, “[The
Mill Acts] cannot be justified upon principle without virtually expunging
the words public use from the constitution.”417
C.

Narrow Interpretations of the Mill Act Cases

Scholars who believe that public use should be interpreted narrowly seek
to distinguish the Mill Act cases supporting the broad view. They
acknowledge that in many cases, early courts did uphold takings made
412. Goho, supra note 180, at 55 & n.99 (noting that the use by the public requirement
originated in Senator Tracy’s concurring opinion in Bloodgood v. Mohawk & Hudson R.R.
Co., 18 Wend. 9, 60–61 (N.Y. 1837) (Tracy, Sen., concurring)); Harrington, supra note 251,
at 1252 (“[T]he so-called ‘public use’ requirement is really a rather late innovation in the law
. . . mainly found in nineteenth and twentieth century American cases.”); Nichols, Jr., supra
note 381, at 617 (identifying the 1840s and 1850s as the time period in which courts began to
use a more narrow interpretation).
413. Goho, supra note 180, at 55.
414. Melton, Jr., supra note 315, at 85.
415. See supra note 373 (listing seven out of the thirteen colonies with Mill Acts prior to
the founding). Delaware and Maryland had repealed their respective Mill Acts by this date,
although likely for reasons not associated with concerns about eminent domain and private
property. See supra note 373.
416. See HORWITZ, supra note 364, at 47 (“The various acts to encourage the construction
of mills offer some of the earliest illustrations of American willingness to sacrifice the
sanctity of private property in the interest of promoting economic development.”); Melton,
Jr., supra note 315, at 82–83 (noting that even though the Mill Acts explicitly took property
from A to give to B, the Acts continued to be upheld for decades following the founding);
Nichols, Jr., supra note 381, at 617 (“Public benefit . . . was long generally regarded as
sufficient to establish public use.”); see also Ely Jr., supra note 15, at 55 (“[I]n the late
nineteenth century both state and federal courts gradually adopted a broader reading of
governmental authority to acquire private property. The constitutional norm of ‘public use’
was increasingly equated with the more expansive concept of ‘public benefit’ or ‘interest.’”).
417. 1 JOHN LEWIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN IN THE UNITED STATES
559–60 (3d ed. 1909).
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pursuant to the Mill Acts. When this happened, they insist, statutes always
required the mills to serve the public.418 In this sense, mills were akin to
public utilities or common carriers, entities that could legitimately exercise
the power of eminent domain for public use.419 Similarly, some suggest in
the alternative that the statutes were simply a carry-over from the colonial
period,420 and courts upheld them based on precedent, even though a strict
public use test would have required invalidation.421
Approaching the cases from another perspective, Professor Richard A.
Epstein argues that takings upheld under the Mill Acts, or in turn of the
century Supreme Court jurisprudence,422 are substantively different from a
case like Kelo. In those instances, the land taken for upstream flooding,
irrigation, or mining differed substantially from a residential property
possessing immeasurable personal value for the owner.423 Specifically,
Professor Epstein views the earlier cases as instances in which “the private
holdout risk was enormous, but the loss of subjective value to the
landowner was negligible,” in contrast to the far more personal losses in
Berman, Midkiff, and Kelo.424
Proponents of a narrow interpretation also criticize scholars who ignore
two early decisions, Calder v. Bull425 and Vanhorne’s Lessee v.
Dorrance,426 both stating in dicta that property cannot be taken for private
uses.427 Courts decided both Calder and Vanhorne’s Lessee within a
decade of ratification of the Takings Clause, and the timing suggests that
they are substantially more probative of original meaning than the Mill Act
precedent.428 In Vanhorne’s Lessee, Justice William Patterson declared
418. EPSTEIN, supra note 225, at 172 & n.24; Sandefur, supra note 16, at 15; Sandefur,
supra note 338, at 600; cf. Claeys, supra note 182, at 921 (discussing the court’s holding in
Ryerson v. Brown, 35 Mich. 333 (1877), that a statute was unconstitutional because it did not
require use by the public). Many of the first Mill Acts required that the mills serve the local
communities. See supra note 377 (listing states that required mills to remain open to the
public).
419. Sandefur, supra note 16, at 16.
420. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 412–13 (explaining that a broad
interpretation prevailed at the turn of the eighteenth century).
421. See EPSTEIN, supra note 225, at 172–74; Note, supra note 337, at 604–05; see also
Sandefur, supra note 338, at 600–01 (noting several states repealed the statutes for violating
the public use limitation).
422. See supra notes 65–75 and accompanying text (examining cases where the Supreme
Court upheld takings for the purposes of furthering irrigation and mining).
423. Richard A. Epstein, Kelo: An American Original, 8 GREEN BAG 2D 355, 360 (2005);
Epstein, supra note 14, at 166.
424. Epstein, supra note 14, at 166.
425. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798). In Calder, the Court decided if a Connecticut law
granting a new hearing in a will dispute was an ex post facto law forbidden by the
Constitution. Id. at 386–87. Justice Chase rejected the idea that there were no limitations on
the power of the legislature, citing naked transfers of property as an inherent restriction. Id.
at 386–91; see also supra note 344 (quoting the exchange between Justices Chase and
Iredell).
426. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 304 (1795). In a circuit court decision, Justice William Patterson
examined a title dispute over lands in Pennsylvania. Id. at 304–06. In the course of the
decision, he discussed the ability of the legislature to expropriate property. Id. at 310–12.
427. Sandefur, supra note 338, at 589 n.98.
428. See id.
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that, “The preservation of property then is a primary object of the social
compact,”429 adding that, “Where is the security, where the inviolability of
property, if the legislature, by a private act, affecting particular persons
only, can take land from one citizen . . . and vest it in another?”430 In
Calder, Justice Chase echoed similar sentiments when he declared that a
law taking property from A to give to B would be invalid.431
D.

Comparing the Broad and Narrow Interpretations

Judicial interpretations of the Mill Acts show there was little consistency
to how courts interpreted public use limitations throughout the nineteenth
century. Whether the words were viewed narrowly or broadly depended
largely on time, and frequently also on location and circumstance. Since
state courts employed an ad hoc approach, cases supporting a narrow
definition and ones applying a broader conception can both easily be cited
in support of a particular theory of the original meaning of the Public Use
Clause.432
These broad and narrow interpretations of the Mill Acts illustrate why
ascertaining the original meaning of the Public Use Clause is difficult. In
particular, when interpreting the words “public use,” courts frequently cited
precedent from earlier decisions instead of engaging in a historical inquiry
on the original meaning of the phrase.433 While it is certain that early
decisions regarding the validity of takings under the statutes interpreted
public use broadly,434 it is also true that these cases generally dealt with
entities required by statute to serve the public.435 It is equally true that the
decisions interpreting public use strictly did not appear until later in the
nineteenth century,436 and proponents of a broad interpretation insist that
this is not the appropriate time period in which to inquire about original

429. Vanhorne’s Lessee, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 310.
430. Id. at 312. Justice Patterson also noted that the legislature could take property from
A and give to B upon payment of compensation and determination of necessity. Id. at 312.
Nonetheless, Justice Patterson used the words “public purposes,” “good of the community,”
“public exigencies,” and “necessity of a state” in the opinion, suggesting that they were
synonymous with “public use.” Id. at 310–11.
431. Calder, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 388; see also supra note 344. In Kelo v. City of New
London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005), Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, did not consider the
taking at issue to be equivalent to the type of “purely private taking” proscribed by Calder.
Id. at 477–78 (quoting Haw. Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 245 (1984)).
432. See, e.g., Dayton Gold & Silver Mining Co. v. Seawell, 11 Nev. 394, 400–01 (1876)
(“The authorities are so diverse and conflicting, that no matter which road the court may take
it will be sustained, and opposed, by about an equal number of the decided cases.”); Lopez,
supra note 82, at 261 (“[T]he result in any given case was, to say the least, unpredictable.”);
Note, supra note 337, at 605–06.
433. See supra notes 388, 394 and accompanying text. But see Harding v. Goodlett, 11
Tenn. (9 Yer.) 41, 52 (1832) (citing Blackstone for the proposition that eminent domain
should be exercised with great caution).
434. See supra note 378.
435. See supra notes 418–19 and accompanying text. But see supra note 388 (listing
states without statutory public access requirements).
436. See supra note 378.
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meaning.437 What remains undisputed by scholars and courts is that the
cases evaluating the Mill Acts are inconsistent at best, and precedent
supporting either a broad or narrow interpretation can easily be found.438
Because of these inconsistencies, the Mill Act cases do not provide a
coherent understanding of the original meaning of public use.
Comparing and contrasting the historical record as a whole shows that
scholarship on both sides of the public use debate cannot satisfactorily
account for all of the evidence on original meaning. Those who advocate
for a broad interpretation have very persuasive arguments based on the
many definitions of “use,” the influence of classical republicanism, the lack
of changes during the ratification process, and early Mill Act precedent. On
the other hand, those who advocate for a narrow interpretation have
persuasive arguments based on the influence of classical liberalism,
interpreting the Clause to give effect to all of its words, and cases preceding
the Mill Acts. Nonetheless, neither the broad nor the narrow interpretation
can satisfactorily explain the comprehensive history of the Clause.
VI. RECONCILING ORIGINALISM AND THE HISTORY OF THE PUBLIC USE
CLAUSE
This Note has shown that the historical record regarding takings is
discrete, yet scholars present drastically different views of the original
meaning of the Public Use Clause.439 The history reviewed by this Note
does not get an originalist any closer to explaining whether Justice
Thomas’s dissent portrays an accurate picture of early American attitudes
regarding public use. Comparing physical takings and regulatory takings
jurisprudence, though, provides an interesting contrast.440 Finding that
regulatory takings also eschewed originalism, this Note closes by proposing
that originalism is not an ideal method of interpretation when there is no
constraining historical guidance.441
A.

A Foray Into Regulatory Takings442

While this Note does not purport to examine regulatory takings
jurisprudence in detail, comparing takings law as a whole reveals
437. See supra notes 412–16 and accompanying text. But see supra note 365 and
accompanying text (explaining that all Mill Act cases are temporally distant from the
founding, a criticism applying equally to scholarly interpretations both broad and narrow).
438. See supra note 432 and accompanying text.
439. See supra Parts III–V.
440. See infra Part VI.A.
441. See infra Part VI.B.
442. The doctrine of regulatory takings refers to instances when regulations (e.g., zoning)
affect property value, as opposed to losses suffered as a result of direct physical
appropriations. JON W. BRUCE & JAMES W. ELY, JR., CASES AND MATERIALS ON MODERN
PROPERTY LAW 678 (6th ed. 2007). The main question in this context is whether a regulation
of land use constitutes a taking, as opposed to whether the taking is constitutional. Id. In
regulatory takings cases, courts must decide whether property owners should be
compensated for the difference in property value as a result of the regulation or whether
compensation should be reserved for physical takings exclusively. Id.
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inconsistencies in the use of original meaning as a method of Constitutional
analysis. Before Kelo, Supreme Court public use jurisprudence squarely
rejected originalism, favoring instead reliance on precedent.443 In Kelo, the
majority opinion continued the trend of eschewing an originalist
approach,444 while Justice Thomas’s dissent advocated overruling precedent
to return to original meaning, claiming that the Court’s public use
jurisprudence was “wholly divorced from the text, history, and structure of
our founding document.”445
A substantial number of scholars agree that the application of original
meaning to regulatory takings cases is inverted. This view is based on the
same history discussed in Part IV, that the Clause originally only
contemplated compensation for physical expropriations, never for
regulatory takings.446 In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,447 even
Justice Scalia’s majority opinion, in which Justice Thomas joined, admitted
that “[in the past] it was generally thought that the Takings Clause reached
only a ‘direct appropriation’ of property.”448 Indeed, the doctrine of
compensation for regulatory takings is based on the precedent set in
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,449 not on the original meaning of the
Takings Clause.
443. See supra note 388 and accompanying text (noting the Court in Head v. Amoskeag
Manufacturing Co., 113 U.S. 9 (1885), stated the validity of eminent domain under the Mill
Acts had long been upheld as satisfying the public use requirement for benefitting the
public); see also Part II.A (explaining that the cases beginning with Fallbrook Irrigation
District v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112 (1896), and ending with Hawaii Housing Authority v.
Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984), did not engage in any textual, structural, or historical analysis
when holding that public benefit satisfied the Public Use Clause).
444. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
445. See supra text accompanying note 157.
446. See Gaba, supra note 213, at 575; Harrington, Regulatory Takings, supra note 277,
at 2055; Hart, Land Use Law in the Early Republic, supra note 276, at 1101; Treanor, supra
note 6, at 782; Treanor, Note, supra note 229, at 711. But see EPSTEIN, supra note 225, at
102.
447. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992); see Ely Jr., supra note 15, at 43–44 (“In short, the famous
1922 decision of Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, in which the Court endorsed the emerging
concept of a regulatory taking, was hardly an innovation. Rather, it reflected the desire of
the Framers for robust protection of the rights of property owners . . . .”).
448. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1014 (citing Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 551
(1871)). Justice Scalia later wrote that not compensating regulatory takings that eliminated
all property value “[was] inconsistent with the historical compact recorded in the Takings
Clause.” Id. at 1028. Nonetheless, he admitted that “[t]he practices of the States prior to
incorporation . . . included outright physical appropriation of land without compensation.”
Id. at 1028 n.15 (citation omitted). While Justice Scalia acknowledged that the Takings
Clause originally applied only to physical deprivations of property, he argued that the postincorporation time period was the relevant inquiry to justify Lucas’s holding. Id. at 1028 &
n.15. But see supra note 372 and accompanying text (explaining why early state cases on
public use are the relevant judicial decisions for an inquiry into the original meaning of the
Takings Clause).
449. 260 U.S. 393 (1922); see also Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 406–07 (1994)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Justice Holmes charted a significant new course, however, when
he opined that a state law making it ‘commercially impracticable to mine certain coal’ had
‘very nearly the same effect for constitutional purposes as appropriating or destroying it.’”
(quoting Mahon, 260 U.S. at 414)); Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1014–15 (“Justice Holmes recognized
in Mahon, however, that if the protection against physical appropriations of private property

316

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79

Opining on physical appropriations and regulatory takings requires
analysis of the same Constitutional clause: “[N]or shall private property be
taken for public use, without just compensation.”450 Advocating an
originalist approach for physical takings451 but a non-originalist approach to
regulatory ones452 seems, at a minimum, contradictory. In contrast to
Justice Scalia’s observation that opened this Note, Justice Thomas accepts
judicial interpretations “wholly divorced from the text, history, and
structure of our founding document”453 in some instances but not in others.
Limiting the social and moral judgments of jurists is an important reason
for employing originalist methods.454 The inconsistent application of
originalism to the Takings Clause, however, questions this justification.
Comparing decision making in physical and regulatory takings cases shows
original meaning may also function to disguise personal judgments. For
example, resorting to originalism to protect property owners from
expropriations but ignoring original meaning to ensure compensation for
regulations affecting value seems more consistent with a political
philosophy than a judicial one. As with the unsatisfactory historical
analysis of public use, this inconsistency in constitutional adjudication of
the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause also lends credence to this Note’s
contention that originalism is not an appropriate method of interpretation
for the Public Use Clause.
B.

Originalism Cannot Provide a Meaningful Limitation in Public Use
Cases

Proponents of originalism believe the interpretive method not only links
judicial interpretation to the original meaning of the text but also constrains
the judiciary’s ability to insert personal judgments into decision making.455
Using the Public Use Clause as a case study, this Note has shown that both
of those justifications for originalism fail in this particular context.
was to be meaningfully enforced, the government’s power to redefine the range of interests
included in the ownership of property was necessarily constrained by constitutional limits. . .
. These considerations gave birth in that case to the oft-cited maxim that, ‘while property
may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a
taking.’” (quoting Mahon, 260 U.S. at 414–15)); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v.
DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 508 (1987) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (“[T]he holding
in [Mahon] today discounted by the Court has for 65 years been the foundation of our
‘regulatory takings’ jurisprudence.”); Robert Brauneis, “The Foundation of Our ‘Regulatory
Takings’ Jurisprudence”: The Myth and Meaning of Justice Holmes’s Opinion in
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 106 YALE L.J. 613, 616–17 (1996).
450. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
451. That is, an analysis of the language “for public use.”
452. That is, an analysis of the language “taken.”
453. See supra text accompanying note 157.
454. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
455. See BERNSTEIN, supra note 206, at 145 (“[T]he certainty of history’s command is the
most reliable restraint.”); supra notes 39–43 and accompanying text. It is important to
clarify that this Note does not argue that originalism is not a valid method of Constitutional
interpretation in general. Rather, it explains, specifically in the context of the Public Use
Clause, that when the doctrine fails to achieve its goals, it is not an appropriate method of
interpretation.
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For example, no scholarship on the original meaning of public use has
adequately accounted for all the contradictory elements of the historical
record.456 In light of this incoherence, originalism fails to connect modern
judicial interpretation to “what the American People meant and did when
We ratified and amended the document.”457 This Note has explained that
particularly in the area of property expropriations, the historical record does
not indicate whether the founding generation had a concrete conception of
the extent to which the rights should be protected. As a result, the
scholarship presents the best evidence supporting arguments on both sides
of the debate, and although there are individually persuasive arguments for
both narrow and broad interpretations, no piece satisfactorily incorporates
all of the historical record.
Furthermore, the Court has consistently eschewed original meaning when
interpreting the Public Use Clause for physical deprivations of property,458
as well as the Takings Clause for regulations affecting the value of
property.459 In rendering a decision on regulatory takings, Justices Scalia
and Thomas acknowledged the Takings Clause did not originally apply to
such regulations.460 Inviting the Court to return to originalism in one aspect
of eminent domain law but not in all aspects seems more tailored to
preserving a consistent political philosophy on takings than a judicial
philosophy on the advantages of originalist interpretation.461
Only three physical appropriations cases have reached the Supreme Court
since the 1950s, and given Kelo’s ruling and deference to legislative
determinations,462 it seems unlikely that one will reach the Court again.
Still, in response to the claims in Justice Thomas’s Kelo dissent that the
original meaning of the Public Use Clause required use by the public, this
Note proposes two answers.
First, as discussed above, the traditional search for original meaning has
failed in this particular context. Even though Justice Scalia recognizes
originalists sometimes reach different conclusions regarding original
meaning,463 the accounts presented by scholars vary widely and do not
provide a satisfactory explanation of the entire history of the Public Use
Clause. Second, the piecemeal application of originalism to takings cases
shows that the methodology might not be fulfilling its goal of excising
personal judgments from decision making.
456. See supra Parts III–IV.
457. See supra note 37; see also BERNSTEIN, supra note 206, at 109 (explaining that, even
in the first ten years after the Constitution’s ratification, “the workings of the new
Constitution raised problems that its framers and ratifiers did not anticipate . . . problems that
cast new and disturbing light on some of their most cherished ideas . . . .”).
458. See supra Part II.A.
459. See supra Part VI.A.
460. See supra note 448 and accompanying text.
461. BERNSTEIN, supra note 206, at 147 (“[Originalism] thus decays from being a
restraint on judicial discretion to becoming a cloak for judicial discretion; judges mold
history as they choose to support their interpretation and then impose the onus for an
unpopular decision on the dead past.”).
462. See supra note 103 (explaining the state legislative response to Kelo’s ruling).
463. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
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In an effort to reconcile originalism with the history of the Public Use
Clause, this Note suggests that the Court’s current approach aligns with a
broader idea of original meaning than the one associated with a detailed
textual, structural, and historical analysis.464 This Note shows that while
the public use case law relies on precedent that does not employ a
traditional originalist analysis, still “the existing constitutional order is” not
“at variance with what we know of the original understanding.”465
Specifically, the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution primarily
addresses issues of legal procedure.466 Further, the protection of minority
interests through republican government represented a major theme of early
America.467 In Kelo, this scenario played out when the Court deferred to
legislative determinations of public use, specifically noting that the states
retained the power to substantively change the level of protection for
private property.468 In response, almost every state legislature reevaluated
its laws regarding eminent domain.469 In this way, the Court’s ruling
allowed individuals to participate in deciding the appropriate level of
substantive property protection.
When public use is the deciding factor in the validity of a taking, both
broad interpretations and narrow ones have line drawing problems.470 The
use versus purpose distinction is simply not always clear or easy to apply in
practice. Protection of property through legislative deference places the
power in the hands of the people to decide what warrants substantive
protection, while preserving judicial oversight for instances in which the
process failed to protect an individual. Interpreting current public use
jurisprudence in this manner seems far more consistent with the Fifth
Amendment’s emphasis on procedure and early Americans’ goals for
democratic government, while also remaining far simpler than searching for
a coherent explanation of the inconsistent history of the Public Use Clause.
CONCLUSION
The government’s power to take an individual’s private property for
public use, provided just compensation is paid to the owner, highlights the
tenuous boundary between individual rights and the common good. While
464. Despite Professor Monaghan’s warning that “[o]riginalism must refer to an
understanding concrete enough to provide a real and constraining guidance,” this Note must
reconcile the history and the methodology at a conceptually broader level since there is no
clear and concrete understanding of the original meaning of public use. See supra note 41.
465. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
466. The current Fifth Amendment contains the Grand Jury Clause, the Double Jeopardy
Clause, the Self-Incrimination Clause, the Due Process Clause, and the Takings Clause. U.S.
CONST. amend. V.
467. See supra notes 292–94, 345–47 and accompanying text; see also WOOD,
RADICALISM, supra note 224, at 322–23 (“Protecting private property and minority rights
from the interests of the enhanced public power of the new republican governments
eventually became . . . the great problem of American democratic politics.”).
468. See supra notes 102–03, 108 and accompanying text.
469. Ely, Jr., supra note 103, at 133–34; Somin, supra note 103, at 2102.
470. See, e.g., supra notes 391, 399 (offering examples of line drawing problems
identified by Mill Act courts).
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the majority’s opinion in Kelo did not stray from public use precedent,
Justice Thomas’s dissent chastised the Court for abandoning the original
meaning of the Public Use Clause. This Note suggested that Justice
Thomas’s interpretation of the Clause’s original meaning is not foolproof.
The historical record and the scholarship interpreting it show that the
founding generation did not possess a definite conception of how far the
government’s power of eminent domain extended. Accordingly, this Note
proposed that traditional originalist Constitutional interpretation is ill suited
for a documentary provision with an ambiguous history, primarily because
the historical record may be cited selectively in support of either a broad or
narrow “original” meaning. Simply put, original interpretation in a
historical grey area fails to achieve the doctrine’s goals of limiting personal
influence on judicial decision making.
This Note concluded by proposing that originalism as an idea can be
reconciled with the history of the Public Use Clause. Specifically, when the
Kelo majority stressed that state legislatures could grant more substantive
protection to property owners, the resulting changes in state eminent
domain law epitomized the virtues of the federal republic created by the
founding fathers. Localities were able to choose the appropriate level of
substantive protection for property rights with the Constitution providing a
minimum level of process protection. In this way, the Kelo decision’s
adherence to stare decisis actually exemplified the original goals of the
founding generation.

